1
00:00:01,801 --> 00:00:02,635
  (narrator): A private         
   charter jet                  

2
00:00:02,702 --> 00:00:03,803
 is flying 15 passengers        

3
00:00:03,870 --> 00:00:06,673
to Aspen, Colorado for a party. 

4
00:00:06,740 --> 00:00:10,310
  - This flight really captured 
  the public attention          

5
00:00:10,377 --> 00:00:12,879
  because of the people         
onboard.                        

6
00:00:12,946 --> 00:00:15,048
   - Poor weather makes         
 the landing a challenge        

7
00:00:15,115 --> 00:00:17,183
   for the experienced pilots.  

8
00:00:17,250 --> 00:00:19,652
 - Can you see out there        
   at all yet?                  

9
00:00:19,719 --> 00:00:21,021
  - No.                         

10
00:00:21,087 --> 00:00:23,523
  - Aspen is considered         
one of the most dangerous       

11
00:00:23,590 --> 00:00:25,558
airports in the country.        

12
00:00:26,059 --> 00:00:27,594
- As the plane nears the runway,

13
00:00:27,660 --> 00:00:30,697
  the controller watches        
   as disaster unfolds.         

14
00:00:30,764 --> 00:00:31,631
   (grunting)                   

15
00:00:31,698 --> 00:00:33,099
 (passengers screaming)         

16
00:00:33,166 --> 00:00:34,567
 - What are they doing?         

17
00:00:35,802 --> 00:00:37,037
 (crash)                        

18
00:00:37,103 --> 00:00:38,538
 - Investigators examine        

19
00:00:38,605 --> 00:00:41,040
    the Gulfstream's wreckage   
   for answers.                 

20
00:00:42,642 --> 00:00:43,943
 - I don't see any issues here. 

21
00:00:44,611 --> 00:00:47,747
 - When they learn about        
   the passengers' behavior...  

22
00:00:48,581 --> 00:00:52,452
- We're running out of fuel here
  for the birthday boy!         

23
00:00:52,519 --> 00:00:55,588
  - ...the moving parts of this 
 mystery fall into place.       

24
00:00:55,655 --> 00:00:57,924
 - That clearly had to put some 
 pressure on the pilots to say, 

25
00:00:57,991 --> 00:00:59,726
  alright, this is not          
  looking good.                 

26
00:01:01,861 --> 00:01:03,063
(man on radio): Mayday, mayday. 

27
00:01:03,129 --> 00:01:05,031
  (theme music)                 

28
00:01:06,232 --> 00:01:08,301
   (automated voice): Pull up.  

29
00:01:08,902 --> 00:01:11,538
   (indistinct radio chatter)   

30
00:01:23,983 --> 00:01:27,821
   (narrator): The sun has just 
set over the Colorado mountains.

31
00:01:27,887 --> 00:01:30,924
Avjet November 3-0-3 Golf Alpha 

32
00:01:30,990 --> 00:01:33,626
    is nearing the end          
 of its journey to Aspen.       

33
00:01:34,294 --> 00:01:36,429
- Well, there's the edge        
   of the night there.          

34
00:01:37,864 --> 00:01:39,032
 - Yeah.                        

35
00:01:39,732 --> 00:01:43,570
 - Captain Robert Frisbie       
  has almost 10,000 flying hours

36
00:01:43,636 --> 00:01:45,472
  to his credit.                

37
00:01:46,005 --> 00:01:48,274
 - What time is official sunset?

38
00:01:49,442 --> 00:01:51,544
  - He and First Officer        
 Peter Kowalczyk                

39
00:01:51,611 --> 00:01:54,814
    have been flying together   
    for close to five months.   

40
00:01:55,982 --> 00:01:57,417
 - 6:28.                        

41
00:01:58,852 --> 00:02:02,655
   - Both pilots have been with 
   Avjet for less than a year.  

42
00:02:03,990 --> 00:02:05,391
    The small charter airline   

43
00:02:05,458 --> 00:02:08,194
 is based out of                
   Burbank, California.         

44
00:02:09,863 --> 00:02:12,732
- Avjet catered to high rollers,

45
00:02:12,799 --> 00:02:15,935
   business people, people who  
 could afford to charter a jet, 

46
00:02:16,002 --> 00:02:19,539
   people who had to get there  
 in a hurry, but do it in style.

47
00:02:20,773 --> 00:02:24,811
- We're running out of fuel here
  for the birthday boy!         

48
00:02:25,645 --> 00:02:28,615
   - A Miami financier          
  chartered this flight         

49
00:02:28,681 --> 00:02:29,983
  for 14 of his friends         

50
00:02:30,049 --> 00:02:34,087
    to attend a birthday party  
at an exclusive venue in Aspen. 

51
00:02:35,321 --> 00:02:39,125
  - This was a group of friends 
 who seemed to have had         

52
00:02:39,192 --> 00:02:42,061
  tremendous early achievements 
  and accomplishments,          

53
00:02:42,128 --> 00:02:44,297
  and they were really          
   going to go places.          

54
00:02:46,733 --> 00:02:49,602
- So, forty-eight hundred pounds
 one-twenty-six?                

55
00:02:49,669 --> 00:02:51,070
   - Wait. It was 50.           

56
00:02:51,137 --> 00:02:54,707
 - You know what, I adjusted it,
  because the fuel was way off. 

57
00:02:55,742 --> 00:02:59,012
 - The pilots are flying        
    a Gulfstream III.           

58
00:02:59,078 --> 00:03:01,114
(engines roaring)               

59
00:03:01,181 --> 00:03:04,951
- The Gulfstream                
  is a luxurious plane          

60
00:03:05,018 --> 00:03:06,753
that, you know people see       
  in the movies                 

61
00:03:06,819 --> 00:03:09,822
  and people think high rollers 
 and movie stars fly in,        

62
00:03:09,889 --> 00:03:11,157
   but it's a workhorse plane.  

63
00:03:11,224 --> 00:03:13,760
 It actually has                
   a good reputation.           

64
00:03:14,928 --> 00:03:18,565
    - It's a 90-minute flight   
    from Los Angeles to Aspen.  

65
00:03:22,101 --> 00:03:25,205
   - Gulfstream 3-0-3           
   Golf Alpha, Aspen,           

66
00:03:25,271 --> 00:03:28,408
 reduce speed to                
 two one zero or slower.        

67
00:03:29,309 --> 00:03:31,477
   - The controller slows down  
  the Gulfstream                

68
00:03:31,544 --> 00:03:33,379
   to maintain a safe distance  

69
00:03:33,446 --> 00:03:36,149
  from the other planes         
   heading into Aspen.          

70
00:03:37,617 --> 00:03:40,920
- Two one zero or slower        
three Golf Alpha.               

71
00:03:44,490 --> 00:03:46,492
    - 17 minutes from landing,  

72
00:03:46,559 --> 00:03:49,696
the pilots begin their descent. 

73
00:03:50,496 --> 00:03:52,966
   Aspen Pitkin County Airport, 

74
00:03:53,032 --> 00:03:54,801
    also known as Sardy Field,  

75
00:03:54,867 --> 00:03:57,804
  is about three miles northwest
    of Aspen.                   

76
00:03:57,870 --> 00:04:01,207
  Landing on its single         
  runway is a challenge.        

77
00:04:02,609 --> 00:04:05,745
  - Aspen is considered         
one of the most dangerous       

78
00:04:05,812 --> 00:04:08,014
airports in the country.        

79
00:04:08,081 --> 00:04:10,984
 The runway is not long         

80
00:04:11,050 --> 00:04:16,589
  and it is in close proximity  
  to high terrain on all sides. 

81
00:04:18,558 --> 00:04:21,327
 - Hey, do you remember         
   that crazy guy in the Lear   

82
00:04:21,394 --> 00:04:23,663
  when we were in Aspen         
   last time?                   

83
00:04:23,730 --> 00:04:27,000
He was, "I can see the airport,"
 but he couldn't see it.        

84
00:04:27,066 --> 00:04:28,701
   (laughing)                   

85
00:04:29,636 --> 00:04:31,037
Okay, set you up                
on the approach?                

86
00:04:31,104 --> 00:04:32,438
 - Okay.                        

87
00:04:32,505 --> 00:04:34,741
 (narrator): The landing        
   is made even more difficult  

88
00:04:34,807 --> 00:04:38,311
   with the final stage needing 
   to be carried out visually.  

89
00:04:39,545 --> 00:04:41,514
    As the plane nears Aspen,   

90
00:04:41,581 --> 00:04:44,384
    a beacon guides it          
 to the airport,                

91
00:04:44,450 --> 00:04:48,087
  but it doesn't lead it        
 directly to the runway.        

92
00:04:48,154 --> 00:04:49,889
  Once the airport is in sight, 

93
00:04:49,956 --> 00:04:53,126
 the pilots must line up        
    with the runway visually.   

94
00:04:53,726 --> 00:04:56,162
  - Because of the high terrain 
   and close proximity          

95
00:04:56,229 --> 00:04:58,231
  to the final approach course, 

96
00:04:58,298 --> 00:05:01,100
  the minimum altitude          
is a couple thousand feet       

97
00:05:01,167 --> 00:05:02,835
above the ground,               
  and we must be visual         

98
00:05:02,902 --> 00:05:08,041
 by that time to safely continue
 our descent down to a landing. 

99
00:05:08,975 --> 00:05:13,346
    - And tonight, the weather  
isn't making landing any easier.

100
00:05:14,981 --> 00:05:17,317
 - If at any time it's snowing, 

101
00:05:17,383 --> 00:05:21,321
it's very hard to acquire       
  that visual reference         

102
00:05:21,387 --> 00:05:24,624
to safely descend further       
  to a landing.                 

103
00:05:27,427 --> 00:05:30,363
- Residential noise restrictions
    around the airport          

104
00:05:30,430 --> 00:05:32,565
 leave the pilots               
    only nine minutes           

105
00:05:32,632 --> 00:05:36,202
 until the landing curfew       
 at 6:58.                       

106
00:05:36,269 --> 00:05:38,471
  The crew is cutting it close. 

107
00:05:39,872 --> 00:05:42,775
  - Can you see                 
  out there at all yet?         

108
00:05:42,842 --> 00:05:44,444
 - Uh...                        

109
00:05:45,812 --> 00:05:47,046
   No.                          

110
00:05:49,082 --> 00:05:53,553
 - Gulfstream three Golf Alpha, 
 heading zero five zero.        

111
00:05:53,619 --> 00:05:54,921
  (Frisbie over radio):         
 Heading zero five zero,        

112
00:05:54,987 --> 00:05:56,789
    three Golf Alpha.           

113
00:05:56,856 --> 00:05:57,924
(engines roaring)               

114
00:05:57,990 --> 00:05:59,726
    (narrator): As the pilots   
    prepare to line up          

115
00:05:59,792 --> 00:06:03,229
   with the runway, passengers  
  get ready for landing.        

116
00:06:03,296 --> 00:06:05,465
  (indistinct chatter)          

117
00:06:11,404 --> 00:06:13,539
   - Okay, synchronizers off.   

118
00:06:13,606 --> 00:06:16,976
   - There is just enough fuel  
 for one landing attempt.       

119
00:06:17,043 --> 00:06:20,847
After that, the pilots will have
  to divert to another airport. 

120
00:06:20,913 --> 00:06:22,648
- Okay, it's off.               

121
00:06:24,684 --> 00:06:26,619
  - Hydraulic pressure's good.  

122
00:06:27,387 --> 00:06:29,522
 - Gulfstream three Golf Alpha, 

123
00:06:29,589 --> 00:06:31,090
   turn heading one four zero,  

124
00:06:31,157 --> 00:06:32,592
 intercept final                
approach course,                

125
00:06:32,658 --> 00:06:35,495
   maintain one six thousand.   

126
00:06:35,561 --> 00:06:37,196
 - Eight minutes                
    from the airport,           

127
00:06:37,263 --> 00:06:39,165
  the Controller                
 gives the crew clearance       

128
00:06:39,232 --> 00:06:41,267
    to commence the approach.   

129
00:06:41,334 --> 00:06:43,669
 - One four zero,               
   one six thousand...          

130
00:06:43,736 --> 00:06:45,304
   ...intercept final           
approach course,                

131
00:06:45,371 --> 00:06:47,073
three Golf Alpha.               

132
00:06:50,343 --> 00:06:51,978
One six thousand.               

133
00:06:55,882 --> 00:06:58,818
  (narrator): As the pilots get 
  their final intercept         

134
00:06:58,885 --> 00:07:00,420
    to the airport...           

135
00:07:01,921 --> 00:07:05,458
- Challenger seven Juliet alpha,
 you have the airport in sight? 

136
00:07:05,525 --> 00:07:08,294
  - ...another aircraft         
    also on approach to Aspen,  

137
00:07:08,361 --> 00:07:10,062
 updates the controller.        

138
00:07:10,129 --> 00:07:13,399
  (Challenger pilot): Ah, that's
    a negative. Going around.   

139
00:07:14,901 --> 00:07:17,203
 (narrator): Those pilots       
   abort their landing,         

140
00:07:17,270 --> 00:07:20,039
    because they can't          
 see the runway.                

141
00:07:21,641 --> 00:07:25,144
- Attention all aircraft,       
   last aircraft went missed.   

142
00:07:26,279 --> 00:07:28,514
 - What?                        
- He went missed.               

143
00:07:28,581 --> 00:07:30,650
- He went missed?               

144
00:07:30,716 --> 00:07:32,351
  Damn.                         

145
00:07:32,418 --> 00:07:33,986
That's not good.                

146
00:07:34,887 --> 00:07:37,190
   - If you can't successfully  
   land the aircraft,           

147
00:07:37,256 --> 00:07:40,026
 then a missed approach         
 is a procedure                 

148
00:07:40,092 --> 00:07:44,597
that pilots will execute        
  to return to a safe altitude. 

149
00:07:45,431 --> 00:07:48,367
- As the Gulfstream gets closer 
 to the airport,                

150
00:07:48,434 --> 00:07:50,470
    the weather deteriorates.   

151
00:07:52,672 --> 00:07:54,974
  (indistinct chatter)          

152
00:07:58,978 --> 00:08:01,981
 - Gulfstream three Golf Alpha, 
   five miles from Red Table,   

153
00:08:02,048 --> 00:08:05,284
   cross Red Table at or above  
   one four thousand,           

154
00:08:05,351 --> 00:08:07,720
clear V-O-R-D-M-E               
Charlie approach.               

155
00:08:09,589 --> 00:08:11,224
 - The Controller               
    clears the pilots           

156
00:08:11,290 --> 00:08:15,127
   to begin the final approach  
    11 miles from the airport.  

157
00:08:17,930 --> 00:08:20,600
   - You have to be configured  
 properly at the right altitude,

158
00:08:20,666 --> 00:08:23,603
   at the right speed,          
   otherwise you are expected   

159
00:08:23,669 --> 00:08:25,805
  to execute a missed approach. 

160
00:08:26,873 --> 00:08:28,441
   - Red Table                  
  at one four thousand,         

161
00:08:28,508 --> 00:08:30,243
   cleared for V O R approach,  

162
00:08:30,309 --> 00:08:33,045
  Gulfstream 3-0-3 Golf Alpha.  

163
00:08:34,514 --> 00:08:36,182
  - Here we go.                 

164
00:08:37,450 --> 00:08:40,019
   - As the pilots get          
  closer to the airport,        

165
00:08:40,086 --> 00:08:43,823
they're counting on the weather 
  to improve for their landing. 

166
00:08:44,657 --> 00:08:46,826
   - Descending to one          
 four thousand.                 

167
00:08:48,427 --> 00:08:50,463
 - Problems can escalate        
  very quickly                  

168
00:08:50,530 --> 00:08:52,231
 when flying into Aspen.        

169
00:08:52,298 --> 00:08:56,702
 There's really no room         
 to recover without breaking off

170
00:08:56,769 --> 00:08:59,138
  that approach                 
   or trying it again.          

171
00:09:00,506 --> 00:09:02,041
- Landing flaps.                

172
00:09:02,108 --> 00:09:03,809
- Landing flaps.                

173
00:09:03,876 --> 00:09:05,912
 - Just over two minutes        
  from landing,                 

174
00:09:05,978 --> 00:09:08,648
  instruments have successfully 
    guided the pilots           

175
00:09:08,714 --> 00:09:10,750
 to the airport.                
   Now it's up to them          

176
00:09:10,816 --> 00:09:12,885
 to identify the runway.        

177
00:09:14,387 --> 00:09:16,689
  - You see the runway?         

178
00:09:20,860 --> 00:09:23,796
 - Gulfstream three Golf Alpha, 
  you have the runway in sight? 

179
00:09:26,666 --> 00:09:28,801
   - Oh. Affirmative.           
   - Yeah, now we do.           

180
00:09:28,868 --> 00:09:31,604
- Yeah, runway in sight,        
three Golf Alpha.               

181
00:09:31,671 --> 00:09:34,941
 (controller): Gulfstream       
three Golf Alpha visual, roger. 

182
00:09:35,441 --> 00:09:37,076
(automated voice): One thousand.

183
00:09:37,143 --> 00:09:38,544
  - One thousand to go.         

184
00:09:39,512 --> 00:09:42,448
  (narrator): The pilots are now
less than a minute from landing.

185
00:09:42,515 --> 00:09:44,850
(beeping)                       

186
00:09:45,451 --> 00:09:47,853
  (indistinct chatter)          

187
00:09:51,857 --> 00:09:53,359
(automated voice): Two hundred. 

188
00:09:53,426 --> 00:09:57,029
(narrator): At the last moment, 
they realise something is wrong.

189
00:09:57,096 --> 00:10:00,433
(engine revving)                
- No, oh! No. No. No. No!       

190
00:10:00,499 --> 00:10:03,869
 (passengers screaming)         

191
00:10:06,172 --> 00:10:09,041
  (tense music)                 

192
00:10:10,443 --> 00:10:12,778
   (grunting)                   

193
00:10:15,348 --> 00:10:17,683
 - Avjet 3-0-3 Golf Alpha       

194
00:10:17,750 --> 00:10:20,953
    crashes just short          
 of the runway at Aspen.        

195
00:10:22,588 --> 00:10:23,889
- Aircraft identification       

196
00:10:23,956 --> 00:10:26,592
Gulfstream 3-0-3                
   Golf Alpha,                  

197
00:10:26,659 --> 00:10:28,995
   aircraft location,           
   it was north of the runway   

198
00:10:29,061 --> 00:10:31,597
approximately...                
 the Shale Bluffs area.         

199
00:10:31,664 --> 00:10:34,133
(sirens wailing)                

200
00:10:34,200 --> 00:10:36,702
  (narrator): Emergency vehicles
    rush to the scene           

201
00:10:36,769 --> 00:10:38,904
    in the hope that there are  
  survivors of the crash        

202
00:10:38,971 --> 00:10:42,141
    of Avjet 3-0-3 Golf Alpha.  

203
00:10:42,208 --> 00:10:45,578
  (tense music)                 

204
00:10:51,050 --> 00:10:54,053
    But all 18 people onboard   
    are dead.                   

205
00:10:54,120 --> 00:10:57,256
    All 15 passengers,          
 the two pilots,                

206
00:10:57,323 --> 00:10:59,592
    and the flight attendant.   

207
00:11:06,599 --> 00:11:09,702
  - This flight really captured 
the media                       

208
00:11:09,769 --> 00:11:13,205
and the public attention        
 because of the people onboard. 

209
00:11:13,906 --> 00:11:18,177
 There were a lot of very young,
talented people.                

210
00:11:23,049 --> 00:11:25,818
  - Put everything from         
  the tail section over there.  

211
00:11:27,787 --> 00:11:31,290
 - By the following day,        
    investigators are on site.  

212
00:11:33,392 --> 00:11:36,862
- Thousands of passengers       
  fly charter airplanes         

213
00:11:36,929 --> 00:11:41,333
every year, encompassing        
2.5 million flight hours        

214
00:11:41,400 --> 00:11:43,669
annually,                       
 so trying to understand        

215
00:11:43,736 --> 00:11:47,073
   why this accident occurred   
was significant.                

216
00:11:51,777 --> 00:11:53,345
   - Let me see that.           

217
00:11:53,412 --> 00:11:55,748
    (narrator): Within hours,   
   the plane's cockpit          

218
00:11:55,815 --> 00:11:57,883
 voice recorder, or CVR,        

219
00:11:57,950 --> 00:12:00,619
is retrieved from the wreckage. 

220
00:12:00,686 --> 00:12:03,422
   - Let's get the data pulled  
 from that ASAP.                

221
00:12:03,489 --> 00:12:06,025
   What about a flight          
 data recorder?                 

222
00:12:10,996 --> 00:12:13,099
  Looks like there wasn't one.  

223
00:12:13,699 --> 00:12:15,067
  Okay.                         

224
00:12:16,836 --> 00:12:20,239
 - Because the airplane         
was manufactured in 1980        

225
00:12:20,306 --> 00:12:22,441
 and registered in 1981,        

226
00:12:22,508 --> 00:12:25,544
   it was not required          
 to have an FDR.                

227
00:12:25,978 --> 00:12:28,380
 - While the CVR is sent        
  for analysis,                 

228
00:12:28,447 --> 00:12:30,716
    Investigators from          
   the National Transportation  

229
00:12:30,783 --> 00:12:33,052
   Safety Board wonder          
  why the pilots                

230
00:12:33,119 --> 00:12:35,287
   weren't able to land safely. 

231
00:12:35,354 --> 00:12:39,391
 - The plane crashed 24-hundred 
  feet from the runway.         

232
00:12:40,226 --> 00:12:42,194
   - When an aircraft crashes   
   short of a runway,           

233
00:12:42,261 --> 00:12:45,164
   especially a sophisticated   
 airplane like a Gulfstream Jet,

234
00:12:45,231 --> 00:12:47,032
  a number of questions         
   arise here:                  

235
00:12:47,099 --> 00:12:49,268
 How did they get there?        
  What possible factors         

236
00:12:49,335 --> 00:12:52,204
  could the crew have?          
Was there some sort of a failure

237
00:12:52,271 --> 00:12:53,939
in the aircraft?                

238
00:12:56,242 --> 00:12:58,377
 - Take a look at this.         

239
00:12:58,444 --> 00:13:00,079
 What do you think caused that? 

240
00:13:00,146 --> 00:13:03,783
   - There's a deep ground scar 
    at the crash site.          

241
00:13:06,552 --> 00:13:07,987
   - That would do it.          

242
00:13:08,053 --> 00:13:10,222
 - Investigators conclude       
    that it was formed          

243
00:13:10,289 --> 00:13:12,992
    when the left wing          
 hit the ground.                

244
00:13:14,126 --> 00:13:16,195
   - When an airplane           
   comes through trees          

245
00:13:16,262 --> 00:13:20,232
  or vegetation                 
  as it approaches the ground,  

246
00:13:20,299 --> 00:13:21,801
  it cuts off branches.         

247
00:13:21,867 --> 00:13:23,702
 And we can look                
at those branches               

248
00:13:23,769 --> 00:13:25,104
  and the angles that are made  

249
00:13:25,171 --> 00:13:27,973
  to understand                 
 the airplane's attitude        

250
00:13:28,040 --> 00:13:32,945
   as it came into the ground   
and its descent profile.        

251
00:13:33,646 --> 00:13:36,982
  - Left wing struck the trees  
   at about...                  

252
00:13:39,285 --> 00:13:41,020
   49 degrees.                  

253
00:13:42,788 --> 00:13:45,124
   - That's a hell of a bank.   

254
00:13:45,191 --> 00:13:47,526
(engines roaring)               

255
00:13:48,994 --> 00:13:51,864
   - There is no operationally  
 relevant reason                

256
00:13:51,931 --> 00:13:54,300
  for an airplane to be         
  banked at 49 degrees          

257
00:13:54,366 --> 00:13:58,370
that close to the airport       
  or that close to the ground.  

258
00:13:59,104 --> 00:14:01,507
- Maybe they lost control       
  of the plane?                 

259
00:14:03,509 --> 00:14:06,879
- When we see an aircraft       
in an abnormal attitude,        

260
00:14:06,946 --> 00:14:08,881
uh, we've got to look at,       
  did something happen          

261
00:14:08,948 --> 00:14:11,383
where the pilots                
 couldn't keep it level?        

262
00:14:11,450 --> 00:14:15,888
   - The plane's position gives 
investigators a promising lead. 

263
00:14:16,388 --> 00:14:17,990
- Engine failure?               

264
00:14:19,558 --> 00:14:22,328
  - The loss of thrust          
resulting from an engine failure

265
00:14:22,394 --> 00:14:23,963
   on one side                  

266
00:14:24,029 --> 00:14:25,431
  can yaw the airplane,         

267
00:14:25,497 --> 00:14:27,166
and if not appropriately managed

268
00:14:27,233 --> 00:14:30,736
  by the pilots                 
  in a timely fashion,          

269
00:14:30,803 --> 00:14:33,239
 can lead to a loss of control. 

270
00:14:34,039 --> 00:14:36,308
 - Aside from the impact damage,

271
00:14:36,375 --> 00:14:39,411
 there's no sign of fire        
to the exterior.                

272
00:14:39,478 --> 00:14:42,314
    - The team studies          
  the engines' compressor blades

273
00:14:42,381 --> 00:14:44,884
   to determine if the engines  
 were functioning               

274
00:14:44,950 --> 00:14:47,086
  when the plane hit the ground.

275
00:14:48,454 --> 00:14:51,223
    When the Gulfstream III's   
   engines are working,         

276
00:14:51,290 --> 00:14:54,727
    the compressor blades spin  
    in a clockwise direction.   

277
00:14:54,793 --> 00:14:56,762
  If the engines                
  were still functioning        

278
00:14:56,829 --> 00:14:58,130
 when the plane crashed,        

279
00:14:58,197 --> 00:15:00,699
    these blades would be bent  
    counterclockwise,           

280
00:15:00,766 --> 00:15:02,868
  or in the opposite direction. 

281
00:15:07,306 --> 00:15:10,409
- No, these are all bent        
 counterclockwise, so...        

282
00:15:10,476 --> 00:15:12,077
it wasn't engine failure.       

283
00:15:13,545 --> 00:15:15,481
- Our examination of the engines

284
00:15:15,547 --> 00:15:18,684
showed that there was no        
  pre-existing damage,          

285
00:15:18,751 --> 00:15:21,387
   no evidence                  
  of an in-flight fire,         

286
00:15:21,453 --> 00:15:23,956
  and also showed that          
  they were operating normally  

287
00:15:24,023 --> 00:15:27,192
and at high power               
   at the time of the impact.   

288
00:15:28,193 --> 00:15:30,729
   - Let's take a look          
 at the rudder.                 

289
00:15:30,796 --> 00:15:33,065
 - An airplane operating        
at a low airspeed               

290
00:15:33,132 --> 00:15:37,202
 while the rudder moves         
   to an extreme limit          

291
00:15:37,269 --> 00:15:39,538
could introduce a rolling moment

292
00:15:39,605 --> 00:15:43,442
 or also stall one of the wings,

293
00:15:43,509 --> 00:15:46,712
 which would further exacerbate 
   the rolling moment.          

294
00:15:47,346 --> 00:15:49,882
 - Investigators examine        
   the actuator                 

295
00:15:49,949 --> 00:15:52,685
  that controls                 
  the rudder's movement.        

296
00:15:52,751 --> 00:15:54,920
  - The piston                  
  is completely intact.         

297
00:15:56,188 --> 00:15:58,190
 No sign of any damage.         

298
00:16:01,126 --> 00:16:04,697
   - There was no pre-existing  
 conditions or failures         

299
00:16:04,763 --> 00:16:06,765
that would have explained       
  the accident.                 

300
00:16:06,832 --> 00:16:08,801
  The airplane                  
was functioning normally.       

301
00:16:09,335 --> 00:16:12,805
 - If mechanical failure        
  didn't cause the roll,        

302
00:16:12,871 --> 00:16:15,207
   what went wrong on approach? 

303
00:16:16,175 --> 00:16:19,044
  - Determining the airplane's  
 flight path helps us understand

304
00:16:19,111 --> 00:16:22,348
how that airplane               
got to the accident site.       

305
00:16:22,414 --> 00:16:23,949
   What was it doing?           

306
00:16:24,016 --> 00:16:26,618
  Where was it flying?          
 How fast was it going?         

307
00:16:26,685 --> 00:16:28,287
   (keyboard clacking)          

308
00:16:28,354 --> 00:16:30,255
  - Have a look                 
   at this radar data.          

309
00:16:32,591 --> 00:16:34,426
- With no flight data recorder, 

310
00:16:34,493 --> 00:16:37,896
    investigators turn          
   to Aspen's radar information 

311
00:16:37,963 --> 00:16:41,533
to reconstruct the Gulfstream's 
 descent profile.               

312
00:16:43,769 --> 00:16:45,604
   - Using the radar position   
and time,                       

313
00:16:45,671 --> 00:16:48,207
 so the altitude                
  and position of the aircraft, 

314
00:16:48,273 --> 00:16:51,276
the performance engineers       
  can extract the speed         

315
00:16:51,343 --> 00:16:53,779
of the aircraft,                
   how fast is it descending,   

316
00:16:53,846 --> 00:16:56,648
 and is that appropriate        
for the approach                

317
00:16:56,715 --> 00:16:59,051
   that they're trying to do?   

318
00:17:00,052 --> 00:17:01,587
- Here's what we've got.        

319
00:17:03,188 --> 00:17:06,225
  This is the approach          
 they should have flown.        

320
00:17:06,291 --> 00:17:09,094
 - Investigators examine        
   the path the pilots          

321
00:17:09,161 --> 00:17:11,730
 were required to follow        
   into Aspen.                  

322
00:17:13,532 --> 00:17:16,969
   - Due to the rising terrain  
 away from the airport,         

323
00:17:17,036 --> 00:17:19,505
   Aspen at this time           
had a step-down approach        

324
00:17:19,571 --> 00:17:23,308
  which from a profile,         
   looks like stairs.           

325
00:17:23,375 --> 00:17:26,045
The pilots will step down       
 to an altitude                 

326
00:17:26,111 --> 00:17:28,947
  based on the terrain          
  availability.                 

327
00:17:29,581 --> 00:17:32,317
 - Pilots cannot descend        
   below that altitude          

328
00:17:32,384 --> 00:17:36,055
until they reach another        
fix or another distance.        

329
00:17:37,256 --> 00:17:38,757
- And...                        

330
00:17:40,626 --> 00:17:43,462
   here's the descent           
the pilots actually flew.       

331
00:17:43,529 --> 00:17:46,365
  - The radar data shows        
 the Avjet flight               

332
00:17:46,432 --> 00:17:50,102
   deviated from the published  
 descent profile.               

333
00:17:51,203 --> 00:17:54,873
 - Four miles out, they dropped 
   300 feet below the minimum,  

334
00:17:54,940 --> 00:17:56,642
and a mile later,               

335
00:17:56,708 --> 00:17:59,812
  they dropped 900 hundred feet 
   below the minimum altitude.  

336
00:17:59,878 --> 00:18:02,047
   - And they stayed that way.  

337
00:18:02,114 --> 00:18:04,450
 They flew in very low.         

338
00:18:06,051 --> 00:18:08,620
- If you go below               
   a minimum altitude           

339
00:18:08,687 --> 00:18:13,258
   before you are allowed to,   
then you no longer can guarantee

340
00:18:13,325 --> 00:18:15,694
  the safety of that aircraft.  

341
00:18:21,867 --> 00:18:23,902
- Why would they do that?       

342
00:18:24,870 --> 00:18:27,773
- Because the pilots did not fly
   this approach to standards,  

343
00:18:27,840 --> 00:18:31,477
 we wanted to look into         
 their backgrounds and training 

344
00:18:31,543 --> 00:18:34,012
  to better understand          
why the accident                

345
00:18:34,079 --> 00:18:36,048
   may have occurred.           

346
00:18:39,885 --> 00:18:44,223
  (narrator): Why did the pilots
    of Avjet 3-0-3 Golf Alpha   

347
00:18:44,289 --> 00:18:48,093
    not follow the prescribed   
  approach procedure into Aspen?

348
00:18:50,329 --> 00:18:52,731
  - The captain passed          
   his last proficiency check.  

349
00:18:52,798 --> 00:18:56,068
   - So did the first officer.  
Just a couple months ago.       

350
00:18:57,669 --> 00:19:00,706
  - Investigators learn         
  that all Avjet pilots         

351
00:19:00,772 --> 00:19:02,074
   are trained to land          

352
00:19:02,141 --> 00:19:04,776
  in mountainous terrain        
   like Aspen.                  

353
00:19:05,444 --> 00:19:08,747
 - And they both flew into Aspen
  together twice before         

354
00:19:08,814 --> 00:19:10,215
without incident.               

355
00:19:11,016 --> 00:19:13,118
 - No accidents,                

356
00:19:13,185 --> 00:19:15,087
no reprimands...                

357
00:19:16,221 --> 00:19:18,790
   Even the Captain's           
   driving record is spotless.  

358
00:19:20,826 --> 00:19:22,494
- So looking into the background
  of this flight crew,          

359
00:19:22,561 --> 00:19:24,363
  we really didn't see anything 
 that stood out.                

360
00:19:24,429 --> 00:19:26,598
 They were both well qualified, 
  well trained                  

361
00:19:26,665 --> 00:19:28,867
 and experienced                
  to fly this airplane          

362
00:19:28,934 --> 00:19:30,869
   and make this trip.          

363
00:19:30,936 --> 00:19:32,271
   - And they both got          
 plenty of sleep                

364
00:19:32,337 --> 00:19:35,440
   before the flight,           
   so fatigue isn't an issue.   

365
00:19:36,208 --> 00:19:38,210
In fact, I don't                
  see any issues here.          

366
00:19:41,013 --> 00:19:42,881
 - This doesn't make any sense. 

367
00:19:45,584 --> 00:19:48,620
   Why would two well-trained   
pilots fly so recklessly        

368
00:19:48,687 --> 00:19:50,255
below the limits?               

369
00:19:52,791 --> 00:19:54,826
   - No matter whether          
 you're a charter pilot,        

370
00:19:54,893 --> 00:19:56,929
  or an airline pilot,          
  or even just                  

371
00:19:56,995 --> 00:19:59,064
   a personal general           
 aviation pilot,                

372
00:19:59,131 --> 00:20:00,566
  you know, our number one job  
   is safety.                   

373
00:20:00,632 --> 00:20:03,335
Uh, regulations are there       
  for a reason.                 

374
00:20:03,402 --> 00:20:05,971
   What is it that could lead   
   a good flight crew           

375
00:20:06,038 --> 00:20:09,474
  to go beyond                  
  those safety limits?          

376
00:20:11,343 --> 00:20:15,414
  - Okay. So we know the pilots 
  landed at Aspen twice before  

377
00:20:15,480 --> 00:20:18,517
without incident.               
  What was different this time? 

378
00:20:20,586 --> 00:20:23,522
- Maybe they were trying        
   to get eyes on the runway?   

379
00:20:24,823 --> 00:20:26,425
 - Pull up the weather.         

380
00:20:28,827 --> 00:20:31,163
  (tense music)                 

381
00:20:35,467 --> 00:20:39,304
- It was important to understand
exactly what was going on       

382
00:20:39,371 --> 00:20:42,574
   with the weather, in terms   
of the layers of clouds,        

383
00:20:42,641 --> 00:20:45,043
whether they were               
solid or broken,                

384
00:20:45,110 --> 00:20:47,012
  to understand                 

385
00:20:47,079 --> 00:20:49,514
  what capability these pilots  
  may have had                  

386
00:20:49,581 --> 00:20:52,718
  to see objects on the ground. 

387
00:20:53,352 --> 00:20:57,556
   - The crash was at 7:02 PM.  
  Back it up to about 6:30 PM.  

388
00:20:57,623 --> 00:20:59,758
(beeping)                       

389
00:20:59,825 --> 00:21:01,994
   - They would've been flying  
 in and out of some pretty heavy

390
00:21:02,060 --> 00:21:04,429
cloud here. So...               

391
00:21:04,496 --> 00:21:07,299
 maybe they didn't have         
   a clear line on the runway.  

392
00:21:07,366 --> 00:21:09,534
- Okay, but these               
  are seasoned pilots.          

393
00:21:09,601 --> 00:21:11,336
They should know                
 if you don't see the runway... 

394
00:21:11,403 --> 00:21:13,472
 - You don't try to land on it. 
   - And yet, they did          

395
00:21:13,538 --> 00:21:15,340
   try to land on it.           
   - And they missed by almost  

396
00:21:15,407 --> 00:21:19,444
half a mile. So,                
 did they see the runway or not?

397
00:21:21,480 --> 00:21:23,515
- We should talk                
   to the controller.           

398
00:21:26,351 --> 00:21:28,987
   - An air traffic controller  
  can tell you                  

399
00:21:29,054 --> 00:21:31,023
 what the visibility is,        

400
00:21:31,089 --> 00:21:32,357
what the weather                
conditions were,                

401
00:21:32,424 --> 00:21:34,026
 what other airplanes were doing

402
00:21:34,092 --> 00:21:37,129
   in terms of coming           
into the airport                

403
00:21:37,195 --> 00:21:39,131
and provide eyewitness testimony

404
00:21:39,197 --> 00:21:40,999
 about the time of the accident.

405
00:21:41,066 --> 00:21:42,934
But they also can help us       
   understand                   

406
00:21:43,001 --> 00:21:45,804
  communications that they had  
   with the airplane.           

407
00:21:48,874 --> 00:21:51,276
 - So did they give you         
  any indication at all         

408
00:21:51,343 --> 00:21:53,311
  that they were having trouble 
   seeing the runway?           

409
00:21:53,378 --> 00:21:55,714
- No. Quite the opposite.       

410
00:21:55,781 --> 00:21:57,449
  I asked them                  
  if they could see the runway, 

411
00:21:57,516 --> 00:21:59,451
   and they confirmed           
 that they did.                 

412
00:22:00,018 --> 00:22:02,954
  Gulfstream three Golf Alpha,  
  you have the runway in sight? 

413
00:22:03,588 --> 00:22:06,425
 (Frisbie): Yeah. Runway        
   in sight, three Golf Alpha.  

414
00:22:06,491 --> 00:22:09,361
  - Gulfstream three Golf Alpha 
 visual, roger.                 

415
00:22:10,829 --> 00:22:12,631
  - Hm.                         

416
00:22:13,265 --> 00:22:15,967
 - I made extra sure to confirm 

417
00:22:16,034 --> 00:22:18,136
  because I couldn't see them.  

418
00:22:18,203 --> 00:22:20,405
 The weather was so bad.        

419
00:22:20,472 --> 00:22:22,974
- Did you have any reason       
  to doubt the pilots?          

420
00:22:23,909 --> 00:22:27,412
- Not at the time, but...       

421
00:22:27,479 --> 00:22:29,381
  here's what's so odd.         

422
00:22:29,448 --> 00:22:31,483
 They confirmed they had visual,
 but when they came out         

423
00:22:31,550 --> 00:22:35,520
 of the clouds, they were headed
  to the right of the airport.  

424
00:22:41,026 --> 00:22:43,028
(engines roaring)               

425
00:22:44,996 --> 00:22:46,631
  What are they doing?          

426
00:22:54,539 --> 00:22:55,574
   I don't think they realized  

427
00:22:55,640 --> 00:22:57,109
   they weren't headed          
 for the runway                 

428
00:22:57,175 --> 00:22:58,910
 until the last second.         

429
00:23:01,446 --> 00:23:03,315
  - When we put                 
those pieces together, you know,

430
00:23:03,382 --> 00:23:05,083
   that the pilots did report   
  on the radio                  

431
00:23:05,150 --> 00:23:06,385
   they had the runway          
in sight,                       

432
00:23:06,451 --> 00:23:08,320
we had to ask ourselves:        
Did they really?                

433
00:23:08,387 --> 00:23:09,755
 Did they really see the runway?

434
00:23:09,821 --> 00:23:14,326
   Um, might they have engaged  
  in a little wishful thinking? 

435
00:23:16,128 --> 00:23:19,865
   - This leaves investigators  
    with a troubling question.  

436
00:23:22,534 --> 00:23:24,436
 - They couldn't see the runway,

437
00:23:24,503 --> 00:23:26,972
  why did they go ahead         
with the landing?               

438
00:23:27,038 --> 00:23:29,574
 - Maybe they were under        
 some kind of pressure?         

439
00:23:31,009 --> 00:23:33,745
   - We needed to know          
   the purpose of this flight,  

440
00:23:33,812 --> 00:23:36,548
  its schedule                  
   and the pilots' activities   

441
00:23:36,615 --> 00:23:38,683
 before they departed for Aspen.

442
00:23:38,750 --> 00:23:42,421
   Looking into what happened   
   before the flight took off   

443
00:23:42,487 --> 00:23:45,023
  from L.A. can help us         
  gain insight                  

444
00:23:45,090 --> 00:23:49,428
into what might have been       
   going on during the flight.  

445
00:23:54,366 --> 00:23:55,867
 - So sorry to keep you waiting.

446
00:23:55,934 --> 00:23:57,302
  - No problem at all.          

447
00:23:57,969 --> 00:23:59,838
    (narrator): To understand   
  why the pilots                

448
00:23:59,905 --> 00:24:02,874
   were so intent upon          
    landing in Aspen,           

449
00:24:02,941 --> 00:24:06,511
    NTSB investigators          
  speak to the Avjet coordinator

450
00:24:06,578 --> 00:24:10,115
 who managed flight 3-0-3       
   Golf Alpha.                  

451
00:24:10,649 --> 00:24:13,418
   - The charter coordinators   
  communicated with the pilots  

452
00:24:13,485 --> 00:24:17,556
moments before the flight       
  departed Los Angeles.         

453
00:24:17,622 --> 00:24:19,558
  They would have insights into 

454
00:24:19,624 --> 00:24:22,394
 what was concerning the pilots,

455
00:24:22,461 --> 00:24:24,696
  what they were trying         
 to accomplish,                 

456
00:24:24,763 --> 00:24:27,866
and some of the decisions       
   being made.                  

457
00:24:28,567 --> 00:24:31,536
  - Did you talk to the captain 
on the day of the flight?       

458
00:24:31,603 --> 00:24:34,239
 - Oh, yes. And there were some 
 problems right from the start. 

459
00:24:34,306 --> 00:24:36,241
- Really? How so?               

460
00:24:36,308 --> 00:24:38,677
 - Well, the flight was supposed
to leave at 4:30.               

461
00:24:38,743 --> 00:24:41,046
At 4:15, he called to say       
 the passengers                 

462
00:24:41,112 --> 00:24:42,848
 still hadn't shown up.         

463
00:24:45,217 --> 00:24:47,486
- Well if the passengers        
   don't show up soon,          

464
00:24:47,552 --> 00:24:49,988
   with the long taxi           
   out to the runway,           

465
00:24:50,055 --> 00:24:52,123
we won't make it                
to Aspen in time.               

466
00:24:52,190 --> 00:24:53,925
  - So what are you suggesting? 

467
00:24:53,992 --> 00:24:55,827
 - Well, we may need to divert. 

468
00:24:57,696 --> 00:25:00,765
- The captain was worried       
that because of the 7 PM        

469
00:25:00,832 --> 00:25:02,234
 noise curfew at Aspen,         

470
00:25:02,300 --> 00:25:04,135
   he might have to go          
to Rifle instead,               

471
00:25:04,202 --> 00:25:06,371
  which is about 60 miles away. 

472
00:25:06,438 --> 00:25:08,206
   - So he knew about           
the noise curfew                

473
00:25:08,273 --> 00:25:10,075
   and he had a plan to divert  
  if he needed.                 

474
00:25:10,141 --> 00:25:11,710
  - Absolutely.                 

475
00:25:13,712 --> 00:25:16,648
 - They knew that Rifle Colorado
   Airport was nearby.          

476
00:25:16,715 --> 00:25:18,450
They had planned                
  for alternatives even before  

477
00:25:18,517 --> 00:25:21,653
   they left, which is exactly  
  what a crew should be doing.  

478
00:25:23,121 --> 00:25:25,290
- When did the passengers board?

479
00:25:25,357 --> 00:25:28,059
  - They didn't start boarding  
till around 4:30.               

480
00:25:29,361 --> 00:25:30,929
  - Then what happened?         

481
00:25:30,996 --> 00:25:33,331
- About 10 minutes later,       
   I got a phone call           

482
00:25:33,398 --> 00:25:35,367
from the client's               
   personal assistant.          

483
00:25:35,433 --> 00:25:38,436
 And he told me                 
   the client was very upset.   

484
00:25:39,905 --> 00:25:41,072
  - Hm.                         

485
00:25:41,139 --> 00:25:43,208
 (assistant): What's this       
    about diverting to Rifle?   

486
00:25:43,275 --> 00:25:44,809
   - What do you mean?          

487
00:25:46,011 --> 00:25:47,612
 - Once the passengers boarded, 

488
00:25:47,679 --> 00:25:52,817
   there was a call by          
the charter customer's assistant

489
00:25:52,884 --> 00:25:56,521
   expressing concern           

490
00:25:56,588 --> 00:25:59,624
  that the crew                 
 had told the passengers        

491
00:25:59,691 --> 00:26:02,427
   that they might have to go   
   to another airport.          

492
00:26:02,494 --> 00:26:04,563
   - Welcome. Welcome.          
  Given the delay in boarding,  

493
00:26:04,629 --> 00:26:07,065
it looks like we may have       
   to divert to Rifle.          

494
00:26:12,504 --> 00:26:15,040
   - So the client had          
 his assistant call me.         

495
00:26:16,241 --> 00:26:19,010
 (assistant): So my boss        
   wants you to tell the pilot  

496
00:26:19,077 --> 00:26:22,614
  to, well, keep his mouth shut 
  around the passengers.        

497
00:26:22,681 --> 00:26:26,585
  And if he has anything to say,
   save it until he gets there, 

498
00:26:26,651 --> 00:26:28,620
and then they can talk it over. 

499
00:26:28,687 --> 00:26:31,056
 - Understood. There is nothing 
 to worry about.                

500
00:26:31,122 --> 00:26:32,424
  I'll take care of it.         

501
00:26:32,490 --> 00:26:34,726
   Thank you very much          
  for letting me know.          

502
00:26:36,428 --> 00:26:37,762
 (sighs)                        

503
00:26:37,829 --> 00:26:40,231
 So, of course,                 
   safety comes first,          

504
00:26:40,298 --> 00:26:43,335
  but we wanted to keep         
the client happy.               

505
00:26:43,401 --> 00:26:45,303
   - And did this make it back  
 to the captain?                

506
00:26:45,370 --> 00:26:47,138
 - Yes, I called him right away.

507
00:26:48,707 --> 00:26:50,008
   - The client's very upset.   

508
00:26:50,075 --> 00:26:52,477
  He doesn't want you speaking  
   to the passengers anymore,   

509
00:26:52,544 --> 00:26:53,845
  only to him.                  

510
00:26:53,912 --> 00:26:57,349
   - Understood, okay.          
Don't mention diverting.        

511
00:26:57,415 --> 00:26:58,917
  - Thank you so much.          

512
00:26:58,984 --> 00:27:00,085
 - Yup.                         

513
00:27:03,722 --> 00:27:07,158
  - He was worried that he was  
  going to disappoint our boss, 

514
00:27:07,225 --> 00:27:10,462
   maybe even get into trouble  
for upsetting the client.       

515
00:27:10,528 --> 00:27:12,998
 But he wouldn't                
get into trouble.               

516
00:27:13,832 --> 00:27:16,601
- In a charter operation,       
  the needs of your passengers  

517
00:27:16,668 --> 00:27:19,471
  are front and center.         
   You're fully aware of them.  

518
00:27:19,537 --> 00:27:22,974
   And in a situation           
 where a group of people        

519
00:27:23,041 --> 00:27:24,476
  are going to a dinner         

520
00:27:24,542 --> 00:27:27,579
   and that's the only reason   
they're taking this trip,       

521
00:27:27,646 --> 00:27:29,814
  if they can't satisfy         
 that timeline,                 

522
00:27:29,881 --> 00:27:33,318
 then there was no point        
   of being on that aircraft.   

523
00:27:33,752 --> 00:27:37,589
(narrator): The Captain was told
   not to upset the passengers. 

524
00:27:37,656 --> 00:27:39,891
   Did that instruction         
   affect his decision          

525
00:27:39,958 --> 00:27:42,494
 about diverting                
   his plane to Rifle?          

526
00:27:42,560 --> 00:27:45,196
  - And so this was all         
  before they took off?         

527
00:27:45,263 --> 00:27:47,232
 - Yes.                         
  - And was that the last time  

528
00:27:47,298 --> 00:27:49,000
you spoke to the captain?       
  - No.                         

529
00:27:49,067 --> 00:27:51,236
   He called me again           
   en route to Aspen.           

530
00:27:51,302 --> 00:27:52,971
- And what time was that?       

531
00:27:54,372 --> 00:27:55,774
 - 6:30.                        

532
00:27:57,542 --> 00:28:00,945
   - We'll be landing at Aspen  
in about 20, 25 minutes,        

533
00:28:01,012 --> 00:28:02,747
 but we'll have to spend        
the night there.                

534
00:28:02,814 --> 00:28:05,016
  - No problem,                 
  I can book you rooms.         

535
00:28:05,083 --> 00:28:08,853
  Hey, how are the passengers?  
  Are they still upset?         

536
00:28:09,587 --> 00:28:10,689
   - I don't think so.          

537
00:28:10,755 --> 00:28:13,124
- What about the client?        

538
00:28:13,191 --> 00:28:14,659
 - I had a talk with the client.

539
00:28:14,726 --> 00:28:17,128
   It's just really important   
to him that we make it to Aspen.

540
00:28:17,195 --> 00:28:19,798
Apparently, he's dropping       
  a substantial amount of money 

541
00:28:19,864 --> 00:28:21,533
   on dinner.                   

542
00:28:22,767 --> 00:28:24,636
- The client didn't want        
 to go to Rifle.                

543
00:28:24,703 --> 00:28:26,538
   Rifle was more than          
 60 miles away;                 

544
00:28:26,604 --> 00:28:28,873
it would have taken them        
 too long to get there.         

545
00:28:28,940 --> 00:28:30,542
- I see.                        

546
00:28:32,110 --> 00:28:34,379
   Okay, well,                  

547
00:28:34,446 --> 00:28:36,414
   thank you very much          
 for your time.                 

548
00:28:36,481 --> 00:28:37,882
- Happy to help.                

549
00:28:39,417 --> 00:28:41,386
  - Although the pilots         
 would be aware                 

550
00:28:41,453 --> 00:28:44,155
  of the needs                  
  of their passengers,          

551
00:28:44,222 --> 00:28:46,658
 at no point can that supersede 

552
00:28:46,725 --> 00:28:49,194
   the professionalism          
  of that crew.                 

553
00:28:49,260 --> 00:28:51,529
 Your primary and only real job 

554
00:28:51,596 --> 00:28:53,865
  is the safety                 
of that aircraft.               

555
00:28:54,866 --> 00:28:57,802
 - You know, it seems they were 
 under a lot of pressure        

556
00:28:57,869 --> 00:29:00,405
to land not only                
before the flight began,        

557
00:29:00,472 --> 00:29:03,007
   but even during the flight.  

558
00:29:04,175 --> 00:29:06,344
  - The crash happened          
 more than half an hour         

559
00:29:06,411 --> 00:29:08,379
  after that last call          
 from the plane.                

560
00:29:09,380 --> 00:29:12,383
    (narrator): Did commercial  
  pressure influence the pilots 

561
00:29:12,450 --> 00:29:16,821
  to make a risky decision that 
   cost the lives of 18 people? 

562
00:29:16,888 --> 00:29:18,857
- You know, this comes up       
  all the time.                 

563
00:29:18,923 --> 00:29:23,528
 Charter pilots                 
often voice on chat rooms       

564
00:29:23,595 --> 00:29:24,996
   and complaint lines          

565
00:29:25,063 --> 00:29:27,599
 that they are pressured        
  to keep people happy          

566
00:29:27,665 --> 00:29:29,400
 and do really difficult things 

567
00:29:29,467 --> 00:29:32,103
 just to satisfy                
  a demanding customer.         

568
00:29:32,170 --> 00:29:33,838
   And it's dangerous.          

569
00:29:35,774 --> 00:29:38,476
  - They still had time         
to correct the situation.       

570
00:29:38,543 --> 00:29:42,113
So what happened                
   in these final 30 minutes?   

571
00:29:47,685 --> 00:29:49,487
  - It's here.                  

572
00:29:49,554 --> 00:29:51,256
  (narrator): NTSB investigators

573
00:29:51,322 --> 00:29:54,025
   turn to the cockpit          
 voice recorder of Avjet        

574
00:29:54,092 --> 00:29:55,994
 3-0-3 Golf Alpha               

575
00:29:56,060 --> 00:29:57,595
   to understand why the pilots 

576
00:29:57,662 --> 00:30:00,265
  chose to land instead         
  of diverting.                 

577
00:30:01,666 --> 00:30:03,301
- We could learn                
about the crew's decision making

578
00:30:03,368 --> 00:30:05,837
and what they were doing        
from their conversations        

579
00:30:05,904 --> 00:30:08,840
 with each other, um, you know, 
 how they were planning         

580
00:30:08,907 --> 00:30:11,643
and using the information       
   that was coming in           

581
00:30:11,709 --> 00:30:13,244
as they approached Aspen.       

582
00:30:14,345 --> 00:30:15,647
- You know what,                
let's pick it up                

583
00:30:15,713 --> 00:30:17,949
before they begin               
  their final descent.          

584
00:30:27,926 --> 00:30:29,694
   (first officer): Hey, do you 
 remember that crazy guy        

585
00:30:29,761 --> 00:30:32,997
 in the Lear when we were       
   in Aspen last time?          

586
00:30:33,064 --> 00:30:35,700
He was, "I can see the airport" 
 but he couldn't see it?        

587
00:30:35,767 --> 00:30:38,136
 (laughing in recording)        

588
00:30:38,203 --> 00:30:39,804
  - Pause that.                 

589
00:30:41,539 --> 00:30:45,343
  So 14 minutes                 
before the crash,               

590
00:30:45,410 --> 00:30:47,745
they're ridiculing another pilot
who tried to land               

591
00:30:47,812 --> 00:30:50,548
  without the runway in sight.  

592
00:30:50,615 --> 00:30:53,251
 Why did they do the same thing?

593
00:30:53,318 --> 00:30:56,988
- At that point,                
 they were still in the mode of,

594
00:30:57,055 --> 00:30:58,389
   we're gonna do this right,   

595
00:30:58,456 --> 00:31:00,258
  and even sort of made a joke  

596
00:31:00,325 --> 00:31:03,027
   about this one guy           
that didn't do it right.        

597
00:31:06,698 --> 00:31:08,032
 - Okay.                        

598
00:31:10,802 --> 00:31:12,804
 - Okay, we'll shoot it         
   from here.                   

599
00:31:12,871 --> 00:31:15,106
   I mean, we're here,          
 but we only get to do it once. 

600
00:31:15,173 --> 00:31:18,443
- Alright. Once,                
 and then we go to Rifle, right?

601
00:31:18,509 --> 00:31:21,446
  - Yeah, it's too late         
 in the evening to come around. 

602
00:31:25,884 --> 00:31:28,219
- So right there,               
  they're talking about         

603
00:31:28,286 --> 00:31:29,787
doing a missed approach.        

604
00:31:30,355 --> 00:31:33,725
   - That was at 6:50,          
  so two minutes later.         

605
00:31:34,859 --> 00:31:36,494
  (narrator): 12 minutes        
    from the airport,           

606
00:31:36,561 --> 00:31:38,529
   the pilots confirmed         
    their plan                  

607
00:31:38,596 --> 00:31:40,899
   to divert if they needed to. 

608
00:31:41,799 --> 00:31:43,935
  - As the crew                 
 was approaching Aspen,         

609
00:31:44,002 --> 00:31:46,738
   they were getting the idea   
  that the weather was getting  

610
00:31:46,804 --> 00:31:48,773
more difficult to get in,       
  and they were having          

611
00:31:48,840 --> 00:31:50,308
   a conversation about this.   

612
00:31:50,375 --> 00:31:52,710
  They mentioned again,         
"Well we might only have        

613
00:31:52,777 --> 00:31:54,579
one shot at this,               
  and we have to go to Rifle".  

614
00:31:54,646 --> 00:31:57,448
 They were really saying        
the right things.               

615
00:32:00,385 --> 00:32:01,953
 (controller): Attention        
  all aircraft.                 

616
00:32:02,020 --> 00:32:03,821
    Last aircraft went missed.  

617
00:32:05,556 --> 00:32:07,825
 - What?                        
- He went missed.               

618
00:32:07,892 --> 00:32:09,594
(first officer): He went missed?

619
00:32:09,661 --> 00:32:12,964
  Damn. That's not good.        

620
00:32:15,800 --> 00:32:17,502
  - Nine minutes from crashing. 

621
00:32:18,536 --> 00:32:21,873
  - They know the plane         
 in front of them couldn't land.

622
00:32:21,940 --> 00:32:24,309
  And they know                 
it's a bad sign for them.       

623
00:32:25,877 --> 00:32:27,979
- That clearly had to put       
  some pressure on them         

624
00:32:28,046 --> 00:32:31,282
  to say, alright, this is uh,  
this is not looking good.       

625
00:32:32,317 --> 00:32:35,320
  - It should have those pilots 
  starting to get into          

626
00:32:35,386 --> 00:32:37,655
the mindset of executing        
   the missed approach          

627
00:32:37,722 --> 00:32:39,190
   rather than landing          
  the aircraft.                 

628
00:32:39,557 --> 00:32:42,860
  - So they know they shouldn't 
   attempt the landing either.  

629
00:32:42,927 --> 00:32:44,729
 - Up until now,                
  they've been doing everything 

630
00:32:44,796 --> 00:32:46,998
   right by the book.           
 - Yeah.                        

631
00:32:47,065 --> 00:32:49,434
 I wonder what changed.         

632
00:32:50,268 --> 00:32:53,304
 - Investigators discover       
    something unusual           

633
00:32:53,371 --> 00:32:55,573
 in the CVR transcripts.        

634
00:32:55,640 --> 00:32:57,008
 - Huh.                         

635
00:32:59,277 --> 00:33:00,545
  It looks like                 
  the flight attendant          

636
00:33:00,611 --> 00:33:02,447
 brought someone                
into the cockpit.               

637
00:33:04,849 --> 00:33:06,985
  - About eight minutes         
  before the accident,          

638
00:33:07,051 --> 00:33:10,922
 somebody came into the cockpit,
 one of the passengers.         

639
00:33:11,689 --> 00:33:13,458
 - Thank you very much.         

640
00:33:14,058 --> 00:33:16,394
  (indistinct chatter)          

641
00:33:20,565 --> 00:33:22,500
 - Do you think it's the client?

642
00:33:25,303 --> 00:33:26,604
- It's possible.                

643
00:33:28,206 --> 00:33:30,475
 - Having somebody else         
  up on the flight deck         

644
00:33:30,541 --> 00:33:32,543
as you're conducting an approach

645
00:33:32,610 --> 00:33:36,647
into a mountainous area at night

646
00:33:36,714 --> 00:33:40,184
 in poor weather                
   is not a good idea.          

647
00:33:43,321 --> 00:33:46,057
    - Did the presence          
  of a passenger in the cockpit 

648
00:33:46,124 --> 00:33:48,359
    play a role in the crash?   

649
00:33:50,561 --> 00:33:52,497
  (tense music)                 

650
00:33:56,100 --> 00:33:58,169
 (Frisbie): The weather's       
    gone down.                  

651
00:33:59,504 --> 00:34:00,838
They're not making it in.       

652
00:34:00,905 --> 00:34:02,974
 (narrator): As the crew        
   got closer to Aspen,         

653
00:34:03,041 --> 00:34:04,342
  the weather worsened,         

654
00:34:04,409 --> 00:34:08,046
 making it more dangerous       
    for planes to try to land.  

655
00:34:08,713 --> 00:34:09,981
  - Oh, really.                 

656
00:34:10,681 --> 00:34:12,316
 - "Oh, really"?                

657
00:34:14,619 --> 00:34:16,421
 - The only conversation        
 that should be going on        

658
00:34:16,487 --> 00:34:20,091
   is between the crew          
  about aspects of the flight.  

659
00:34:20,158 --> 00:34:21,893
If you're having someone        
  up there questioning          

660
00:34:21,959 --> 00:34:23,928
 their decision making,         
 questioning, you know,         

661
00:34:23,995 --> 00:34:25,396
 the weather and the operation, 

662
00:34:25,463 --> 00:34:28,533
um, it's just such a distraction
 and a pressure to them.        

663
00:34:30,168 --> 00:34:32,236
 - As the pilots approach       
   the airport,                 

664
00:34:32,303 --> 00:34:34,572
    the situation intensified.  

665
00:34:36,107 --> 00:34:38,709
 - Challenger nine eight Romeo, 
   you're number one.           

666
00:34:39,310 --> 00:34:40,778
   (Challenger pilot):          
    Nine eight Romeo,           

667
00:34:40,845 --> 00:34:43,114
  negative visual on the missed.

668
00:34:43,181 --> 00:34:45,616
   (narrator): They learn that  
 the plane ahead of Avjet       

669
00:34:45,683 --> 00:34:47,151
 3-0-3 Golf Alpha               

670
00:34:47,218 --> 00:34:49,153
    also missed their approach  

671
00:34:49,220 --> 00:34:51,322
    because they couldn't see   
   the runway.                  

672
00:34:52,190 --> 00:34:54,158
  - It's too dangerous to land  
 on that runway                 

673
00:34:54,225 --> 00:34:56,761
 under these conditions.        

674
00:34:56,828 --> 00:34:58,362
  - So, what happened?          

675
00:35:03,968 --> 00:35:05,503
- Are we cleared to land?       

676
00:35:05,570 --> 00:35:07,371
 - No, not yet.                 

677
00:35:07,438 --> 00:35:08,439
 He just missed,                

678
00:35:08,506 --> 00:35:10,942
 the guy in front of us         
 didn't make it either.         

679
00:35:11,008 --> 00:35:12,510
  - Oh, really.                 

680
00:35:16,080 --> 00:35:17,682
- Okay, so it sounds like       
this guy                        

681
00:35:17,748 --> 00:35:19,617
is sending the pilots a message.

682
00:35:19,684 --> 00:35:21,385
   - Exactly.                   

683
00:35:23,121 --> 00:35:25,056
 - "Oh, really," may not        
sound like much,                

684
00:35:25,123 --> 00:35:28,092
but after all those other       
things that had occurred,       

685
00:35:28,159 --> 00:35:31,195
  I think, "Oh, really"         
   was a warning shot.          

686
00:35:31,262 --> 00:35:33,264
Get this thing in Aspen.        

687
00:35:34,365 --> 00:35:37,001
    - But the pilots still had  
 one more chance                

688
00:35:37,068 --> 00:35:38,803
to implement their back-up plan 

689
00:35:38,870 --> 00:35:41,072
  to divert to another airport. 

690
00:35:44,375 --> 00:35:45,576
- Where's it at?                

691
00:35:47,411 --> 00:35:50,314
   - So obviously, they still   
  can't see the runway.         

692
00:35:53,251 --> 00:35:55,620
 - To the right.                
 - To the right.                

693
00:36:01,425 --> 00:36:04,095
   - So, instead of executing   
   a missed approach,           

694
00:36:04,161 --> 00:36:05,329
  they're still looking         
 for the runway,                

695
00:36:05,396 --> 00:36:07,565
which is actually to their left.

696
00:36:08,499 --> 00:36:10,568
   - There was a river valley   
 and some roads nearby.         

697
00:36:10,635 --> 00:36:12,970
 Might they have seen something 
  they thought was the runway,  

698
00:36:13,037 --> 00:36:15,339
  you know, some lights         
   of the village or whatnot.   

699
00:36:15,406 --> 00:36:16,908
   Then they believed           
  they saw the runway,          

700
00:36:16,974 --> 00:36:18,576
but that wasn't correct.        

701
00:36:19,377 --> 00:36:21,078
 - They just keep flying        
 lower and lower                

702
00:36:21,145 --> 00:36:23,080
looking for the airport.        

703
00:36:24,448 --> 00:36:26,651
  They were just under          
  way too much pressure         

704
00:36:26,717 --> 00:36:28,486
 to make good decisions.        

705
00:36:31,155 --> 00:36:32,924
  - They had the night curfew.  

706
00:36:32,990 --> 00:36:34,225
 They had a, the time pressure, 

707
00:36:34,292 --> 00:36:36,260
uh, pressure from               
   the client as well,          

708
00:36:36,327 --> 00:36:39,030
  um, and then with the weather 
coming in and out               

709
00:36:39,096 --> 00:36:41,332
  as they stepped down,         

710
00:36:41,399 --> 00:36:44,168
  they'd catch glimpses         
   now and then of the ground.  

711
00:36:45,036 --> 00:36:46,904
(automated voice): Five hundred.

712
00:36:46,971 --> 00:36:48,272
(first officer): Ref plus five. 

713
00:36:48,339 --> 00:36:50,441
  (automated voice): Sink rate. 
    Sink rate.                  

714
00:36:52,510 --> 00:36:54,712
  (narrator): 22 seconds        
  after crossing                

715
00:36:54,779 --> 00:36:56,314
    the missed approach point,  

716
00:36:56,380 --> 00:37:00,618
  Avjet 3-0-3 Golf Alpha        
 hits the ground.               

717
00:37:00,685 --> 00:37:02,587
   (grunting)                   

718
00:37:02,653 --> 00:37:04,555
 (passengers screaming)         

719
00:37:10,494 --> 00:37:12,096
(engines roaring)               

720
00:37:12,163 --> 00:37:15,066
   (grunting)                   

721
00:37:24,709 --> 00:37:27,078
 - So...                        

722
00:37:27,144 --> 00:37:29,847
 in Los Angeles,                
   they were ready to divert.   

723
00:37:31,716 --> 00:37:34,819
Then they get chewed out        
  for talking about diverting,  

724
00:37:34,885 --> 00:37:37,989
and the client tells them       
  how important the dinner is.  

725
00:37:38,055 --> 00:37:39,323
   Topping it all off,          

726
00:37:39,390 --> 00:37:41,025
  the passenger enters          
  the cockpit.                  

727
00:37:41,092 --> 00:37:42,593
- So, by the time               
  they get to Aspen...          

728
00:37:42,660 --> 00:37:45,396
- They were bound and determined
to land.                        

729
00:37:48,366 --> 00:37:52,303
- Sadly, they turned into       
the pilots they were ridiculing.

730
00:37:53,304 --> 00:37:56,307
- All indications               

731
00:37:56,374 --> 00:37:58,542
 from our investigation         

732
00:37:58,609 --> 00:38:01,412
   show that these two pilots   
were good pilots.               

733
00:38:01,479 --> 00:38:05,716
 Once the crew descended        
 without the runway in sight... 

734
00:38:07,318 --> 00:38:09,353
  the accident was inevitable.  

735
00:38:11,355 --> 00:38:14,759
- They just kept pushing,       
and step by step,               

736
00:38:14,825 --> 00:38:17,128
  it got worse and worse until  

737
00:38:17,194 --> 00:38:19,030
 they descended too low.        

738
00:38:19,096 --> 00:38:20,831
   (narrator): Despite          
  the pressures                 

739
00:38:20,898 --> 00:38:22,767
  the pilots were under to land,

740
00:38:22,833 --> 00:38:24,502
   there was one more safeguard 

741
00:38:24,568 --> 00:38:26,837
    that could have prevented   
  this tragedy.                 

742
00:38:26,904 --> 00:38:28,673
- You're not gonna believe this.

743
00:38:29,707 --> 00:38:32,243
   (intriguing music)           

744
00:38:38,516 --> 00:38:42,153
    rator): Investigators       
    of Avjet 3-0-3 Golf Alpha   

745
00:38:42,219 --> 00:38:43,754
 examine a safety notice        

746
00:38:43,821 --> 00:38:47,391
   for Aspen Airport that might 
    have prevented the crash.   

747
00:38:47,892 --> 00:38:49,794
   - A NOTAM.                   

748
00:38:50,394 --> 00:38:53,798
  - NOTAM is an official        
    Notice to Airmen.           

749
00:38:55,066 --> 00:38:57,401
- That's a notice put out       
   by the FAA                   

750
00:38:57,468 --> 00:38:59,737
  to tell pilots about          
some abnormality                

751
00:38:59,804 --> 00:39:01,372
 in the airspace system.        

752
00:39:01,439 --> 00:39:03,474
  An approach procedure         
has been changed,               

753
00:39:03,541 --> 00:39:06,544
a navigation aide is out,       
um, all sorts of things.        

754
00:39:08,245 --> 00:39:11,649
   - Two days before the crash, 
    a NOTAM was issued          

755
00:39:11,716 --> 00:39:14,218
   with a warning about         
    landing at Aspen.           

756
00:39:15,119 --> 00:39:17,188
- As far as I can tell, it says,

757
00:39:17,254 --> 00:39:20,257
  "Circling NA,                 
   not authorized, at night."   

758
00:39:20,324 --> 00:39:21,826
  - So, in other words,         

759
00:39:21,892 --> 00:39:23,961
   they should never have been  
   flying into Aspen at night   

760
00:39:24,028 --> 00:39:25,629
   in the first place.          

761
00:39:25,696 --> 00:39:30,701
 - It said that circling        
not authorized at night.        

762
00:39:30,768 --> 00:39:32,970
  This approach is only         
  a circling approach,          

763
00:39:33,037 --> 00:39:35,773
even if you elect to land       
  straight in.                  

764
00:39:35,840 --> 00:39:37,274
   It actually had the effect   

765
00:39:37,341 --> 00:39:40,845
 of making that approach        
not authorized at night.        

766
00:39:42,513 --> 00:39:45,449
   - The crash was at 7:02 PM.  
What time was nightfall?        

767
00:39:45,516 --> 00:39:49,887
   - Nightfall was officially   
at 6:55.                        

768
00:39:50,855 --> 00:39:53,290
  - Well, that's seven minutes  
before the crash.               

769
00:39:53,357 --> 00:39:55,559
 Why didn't they follow         
   the NOTAM?                   

770
00:39:58,095 --> 00:40:00,431
 - Investigators examine        
 the Gulfstream's               

771
00:40:00,498 --> 00:40:02,266
 briefing records to see        

772
00:40:02,333 --> 00:40:04,869
  if it included                
 the most recent notice.        

773
00:40:06,470 --> 00:40:09,173
  - It looks the first officer  
  did receive the NOTAM         

774
00:40:09,240 --> 00:40:11,175
 over the phone                 
   before the flight.           

775
00:40:11,909 --> 00:40:14,779
- So who knows if               
 he passed it on to the Captain.

776
00:40:16,313 --> 00:40:17,882
   - NOTAM's are hard to read,  

777
00:40:17,948 --> 00:40:20,684
  there's a lot of um,          
 extraneous information in them.

778
00:40:20,751 --> 00:40:23,988
 They tell you about everything 
   from a burned-out lightbulb  

779
00:40:24,054 --> 00:40:25,923
 on a tower fifteen miles away, 

780
00:40:25,990 --> 00:40:29,026
to the runway is closed,        
   and everything in between.   

781
00:40:29,093 --> 00:40:31,796
- And what about the controller?

782
00:40:35,266 --> 00:40:38,235
 - NOTAM's are also distributed 
   to ATC facilities.           

783
00:40:38,302 --> 00:40:39,370
 They need to know about        

784
00:40:39,437 --> 00:40:41,806
   things that affect           
  the airspace as well.         

785
00:40:45,142 --> 00:40:48,345
- It never got passed on        
  to Aspen ATC.                 

786
00:40:53,717 --> 00:40:55,586
 - The reason the tower         
  didn't get the NOTAM          

787
00:40:55,653 --> 00:40:58,823
is it was supposed to get       
sent by, believe it or not, fax,

788
00:40:58,889 --> 00:41:00,691
and for whatever reason,        

789
00:41:00,758 --> 00:41:03,127
   it didn't get sent           
  to the ATC facilities         

790
00:41:03,194 --> 00:41:05,463
  that needed to know.          

791
00:41:05,529 --> 00:41:08,399
  - Had the Controller received 
    the NOTAM,                  

792
00:41:08,466 --> 00:41:11,335
  it might have                 
   prevented the crash.         

793
00:41:11,402 --> 00:41:14,371
  In the final analysis,        
  investigators conclude        

794
00:41:14,438 --> 00:41:16,340
    the probable cause          
 of the accident                

795
00:41:16,407 --> 00:41:19,310
  was the flight crew's         
    operation of the airplane   

796
00:41:19,376 --> 00:41:21,612
    below the minimum           
 descent altitude               

797
00:41:21,679 --> 00:41:25,449
  without an appropriate visual 
 reference to the runway.       

798
00:41:26,484 --> 00:41:28,085
- This accident happened        

799
00:41:28,152 --> 00:41:30,421
   because the captain          
   did not go around,           

800
00:41:30,488 --> 00:41:32,790
 did not conduct                
   a missed approach.           

801
00:41:33,924 --> 00:41:35,626
Had he done that,               

802
00:41:35,693 --> 00:41:37,728
  they would have gone          
to Rifle.                       

803
00:41:37,795 --> 00:41:39,997
   And the passengers may have  
been frustrated,                

804
00:41:40,064 --> 00:41:41,732
  may have been angry.          
   There might have been a big  

805
00:41:41,799 --> 00:41:44,835
 conversation, but they         
 would have been alive.         

806
00:41:48,439 --> 00:41:51,408
   - Investigators also believe 
    external pressures          

807
00:41:51,475 --> 00:41:54,478
   played a role in the pilots' 
 decision-making.               

808
00:41:56,480 --> 00:41:58,015
 - We call it "get there-itus". 

809
00:41:58,082 --> 00:41:59,550
  We were close                 
   to the destination,          

810
00:41:59,617 --> 00:42:03,420
  almost there and the pressure 
 on people to make the decision.

811
00:42:03,487 --> 00:42:05,689
 Nothing broke,                 
 nothing really failed,         

812
00:42:05,756 --> 00:42:07,391
 other than just                
  the decision-making,          

813
00:42:07,458 --> 00:42:10,761
   under pressures of           
"get there-itus".               

814
00:42:13,564 --> 00:42:15,733
- As a result of this accident, 

815
00:42:15,799 --> 00:42:18,135
  Avjet restricts flying        
    into Aspen                  

816
00:42:18,202 --> 00:42:20,371
   between sunset and sunrise.  

817
00:42:20,437 --> 00:42:23,407
   The FAA also revises         
    its specifications          

818
00:42:23,474 --> 00:42:24,708
  for flying into Aspen,        

819
00:42:24,775 --> 00:42:27,711
    with a minimum visibility   
  of five miles                 

820
00:42:27,778 --> 00:42:30,748
and a cloud ceiling of at least 
 44-hundred feet                

821
00:42:30,814 --> 00:42:33,784
    above ground now required   
   for landing.                 

822
00:42:36,520 --> 00:42:38,489
  - You see the runway?         

823
00:42:38,556 --> 00:42:41,959
    - This is to ensure pilots  
 always have a clear view       

824
00:42:42,026 --> 00:42:44,395
  of the runway before landing. 

825
00:42:44,895 --> 00:42:46,196
 - Thank you very much.         

826
00:42:46,263 --> 00:42:47,731
 - Avjet also takes steps       

827
00:42:47,798 --> 00:42:50,434
  to prevent unnecessary        
   distractions in the cockpit  

828
00:42:50,501 --> 00:42:52,236
    during the flight.          

829
00:42:52,937 --> 00:42:55,873
  - After the accident,         
  the company issued a bulletin 

830
00:42:55,940 --> 00:42:59,076
  changing their rules          
   that no passengers           

831
00:42:59,143 --> 00:43:01,579
  were allowed in the cockpit.  

832
00:43:01,946 --> 00:43:05,549
  - Okay, guys.                 
Let's finish up tomorrow.       

833
00:43:06,917 --> 00:43:09,987
 - Well, the NTSB has also made 
   a number of recommendations  

834
00:43:10,054 --> 00:43:12,222
 on improving the NOTAM system, 

835
00:43:12,289 --> 00:43:15,125
 making things a little bit more
graphical and easy to use       

836
00:43:15,192 --> 00:43:16,493
so that people can sort them out

837
00:43:16,560 --> 00:43:18,862
rather than just                
 reading a list.                

838
00:43:19,730 --> 00:43:21,699
- The lessons serve as a warning

839
00:43:21,765 --> 00:43:25,469
   to all other pilots          
  who interact with passengers. 

840
00:43:26,437 --> 00:43:28,672
  - I think the message         
 of this flight                 

841
00:43:28,739 --> 00:43:32,409
 is there is no                 
 dinner date engagement,        

842
00:43:32,476 --> 00:43:35,045
or birthday party               
 that is more important         

843
00:43:35,112 --> 00:43:38,382
 than the lives                 
of your passengers on the plane.

844
00:43:38,449 --> 00:43:40,818
 And the pilot has to be        
  tough enough                  

845
00:43:40,884 --> 00:43:42,553
  to stand up to that,          

846
00:43:42,620 --> 00:43:44,989
 because the passengers         
just don't know.                

847
00:43:45,055 --> 00:43:46,924
   They're not pilots,          
  and they do not know          

848
00:43:46,991 --> 00:43:51,395
   that their behavior          
is endangering their very lives.

849
00:43:51,462 --> 00:43:53,564
 But it did help change the law 

850
00:43:53,631 --> 00:43:55,799
 and change how the FAA operates

851
00:43:55,866 --> 00:43:59,470
in many aspects.                
  And for that, we're thankful. 

852
00:44:05,576 --> 00:44:08,746
  (theme music)                 

853
00:44:27,331 --> 00:44:29,700
   Subtitling: difuze