1 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:08,000 ♪ ♪ 2 00:00:28,570 --> 00:00:30,846 On the morning of October 29th, I was woken up by a 3 00:00:30,870 --> 00:00:37,946 colleague who alerted me that a Lion aircraft crashed. 4 00:00:37,970 --> 00:00:41,646 He said, "It's the MAX." And I was surprised because it 5 00:00:41,670 --> 00:00:45,376 was a new aircraft. My company provided the air data 6 00:00:45,400 --> 00:00:49,346 for aircraft flying around the Jakarta area. 7 00:00:49,370 --> 00:00:53,546 So I went to the computer and looked at the data. 8 00:00:53,570 --> 00:00:59,576 It was immediately apparent that, okay, something was wrong. 9 00:00:59,600 --> 00:01:02,746 The plane went up to about 2,000 feet, just over a minute after 10 00:01:02,770 --> 00:01:06,246 takeoff, and the plane had a bit of a dive. 11 00:01:06,270 --> 00:01:12,606 And then the plane climbed to about 5,000 feet. 12 00:01:12,630 --> 00:01:14,946 But then, at 5,000 feet, the plane was fluctuating up and 13 00:01:14,970 --> 00:01:17,546 down. And then the plane just started 14 00:01:17,570 --> 00:01:19,746 diving. It just didn't make sense. 15 00:01:19,770 --> 00:01:23,106 You don't see planes diving on departure. 16 00:01:23,130 --> 00:01:25,506 I was baffled. Why did it go down? 17 00:01:25,530 --> 00:01:31,776 ♪ ♪ Lion Air flight JT610 went 18 00:01:31,800 --> 00:01:34,276 missing from radar... NARRATOR: 189 people were 19 00:01:34,300 --> 00:01:37,776 killed in the crash of Lion Air Flight 610. 20 00:01:37,800 --> 00:01:41,846 The Boeing 737 MAX 8. NARRATOR: The plane was a new 21 00:01:41,870 --> 00:01:45,246 Boeing 737 MAX... What do we know about this 22 00:01:45,270 --> 00:01:48,406 737 MAX 8? NARRATOR: the 23 00:01:48,430 --> 00:01:50,446 fastest-selling jet in Boeing history... just introduced the 24 00:01:50,470 --> 00:01:52,706 year before. We don't yet know what caused 25 00:01:52,730 --> 00:01:56,076 this crash. A breakthrough this evening. 26 00:01:56,100 --> 00:01:59,376 The flight data recorder. It holds many of the keys... 27 00:01:59,400 --> 00:02:01,206 NARRATOR: The data from the black box quickly got to F.A.A. 28 00:02:01,230 --> 00:02:05,400 engineers in the United States. ♪ ♪ 29 00:02:05,830 --> 00:02:08,106 There is a purity of this data. 30 00:02:08,130 --> 00:02:10,346 It comes directly from the black boxes. 31 00:02:10,370 --> 00:02:13,830 So it's recording airspeed, altitude. 32 00:02:14,300 --> 00:02:17,346 NARRATOR: The data showed what appeared to be a glitch... 33 00:02:17,370 --> 00:02:20,146 Something repeatedly moving part of the plane's tail, controlling 34 00:02:20,170 --> 00:02:23,076 its pitch. It didn't take long, just a 35 00:02:23,100 --> 00:02:26,946 couple of minutes, to see that there was rapid movement of the 36 00:02:26,970 --> 00:02:30,276 horizontal stabilizer. It's probably the fastest way to 37 00:02:30,300 --> 00:02:32,976 kill yourself in an airplane is to have the stabilizer 38 00:02:33,000 --> 00:02:36,906 malfunction. ♪ ♪ 39 00:02:36,930 --> 00:02:39,246 My spine literally tingled when I saw the traces from the 40 00:02:39,270 --> 00:02:42,906 black box. The plane continually tried to 41 00:02:42,930 --> 00:02:47,676 push the nose down and the pilots were trying over and over 42 00:02:47,700 --> 00:02:52,146 again to stop the plane. And in the end, they lose that 43 00:02:52,170 --> 00:02:55,046 battle. NARRATOR: What Boeing had not 44 00:02:55,070 --> 00:02:58,446 told airlines or their pilots was that it had put a powerful 45 00:02:58,470 --> 00:03:01,376 software system on the new airplane. 46 00:03:01,400 --> 00:03:04,576 In the Lion Air crash, this system was receiving incorrect 47 00:03:04,600 --> 00:03:09,076 information, and that made the plane dive straight downward and 48 00:03:09,100 --> 00:03:13,806 destroy itself. NARRATOR: Inside Boeing, they 49 00:03:13,830 --> 00:03:17,746 quickly diagnosed the problem and began working on a fix. 50 00:03:17,770 --> 00:03:20,246 But they stood by the MAX as hundreds of them took to the air 51 00:03:20,270 --> 00:03:24,946 around the world, carrying thousands of passengers. 52 00:03:24,970 --> 00:03:27,476 The company alerted pilots about handling a potential 53 00:03:27,500 --> 00:03:30,376 malfunction. Boeing and the F.A.A. today 54 00:03:30,400 --> 00:03:34,806 warned airlines that sensors on the 737 MAX 8 jets can 55 00:03:34,830 --> 00:03:37,006 malfunction. Boeing are calling this a 56 00:03:37,030 --> 00:03:39,230 formal advisory and it's been issued to the pilots. 57 00:03:39,870 --> 00:03:43,906 The reporting showed Boeing knew that it was risky, but 58 00:03:43,930 --> 00:03:49,300 their response was to blame the pilots. 59 00:03:49,700 --> 00:03:52,146 Pilots did not hit two cut- off switches. 60 00:03:52,170 --> 00:03:54,776 Boeing says that action was part of well-established protocols 61 00:03:54,800 --> 00:03:58,606 for all 737s. And that led to a series of 62 00:03:58,630 --> 00:04:02,146 decisions that kept the plane in the air. 63 00:04:02,170 --> 00:04:06,746 And then we got another crash. Breaking news out of 64 00:04:06,770 --> 00:04:08,906 Ethiopia, where a plane went down. 65 00:04:08,930 --> 00:04:11,846 NARRATOR: It was Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, on its way 66 00:04:11,870 --> 00:04:16,806 to Nairobi from Addis Ababa. A new 737 MAX 8 jetliner 67 00:04:16,830 --> 00:04:19,176 crashed minutes after taking off. 68 00:04:19,200 --> 00:04:23,446 NARRATOR: Two crashes, the same plane: 346 people killed, 69 00:04:23,470 --> 00:04:28,676 an iconic American company's reputation in tatters. 70 00:04:28,700 --> 00:04:32,206 The story of the Boeing 737 MAX would end up exposing corporate 71 00:04:32,230 --> 00:04:36,146 deception and a broken regulatory process. 72 00:04:36,170 --> 00:04:39,206 But at the center was a software system supposed to keep people 73 00:04:39,230 --> 00:04:43,470 safe that instead led to their deaths. 74 00:04:50,230 --> 00:04:58,230 The black boxes from the 75 00:05:12,470 --> 00:05:16,546 Ethiopian crash have been recovered. 76 00:05:16,570 --> 00:05:19,676 It's the second disaster within five months involving the 77 00:05:19,700 --> 00:05:25,706 Boeing 737 MAX. That's the same kind of 78 00:05:25,730 --> 00:05:29,476 aircraft that crashed back in October in Indonesia. 79 00:05:29,500 --> 00:05:35,376 ♪ ♪ 157 people, including 80 00:05:35,400 --> 00:05:38,746 passengers and crew members on board, all are dead. 81 00:05:38,770 --> 00:05:43,776 ♪ ♪ The first thing you get to 82 00:05:43,800 --> 00:05:47,300 see at the site is a very big hole. 83 00:05:47,670 --> 00:05:51,106 And then to only imagine, this is the place that they were 84 00:05:51,130 --> 00:05:56,206 last alive. ♪ ♪ 85 00:05:56,230 --> 00:05:59,646 We learned that there were no survivors on the plane. 86 00:05:59,670 --> 00:06:03,906 And then our objective was to go and bring my daughter's body 87 00:06:03,930 --> 00:06:08,946 home. Now, you're in close 88 00:06:08,970 --> 00:06:12,406 proximity, you're able to see the fine details, you're able to 89 00:06:12,430 --> 00:06:17,046 maybe think, these are personal effects belonged to Carol, my 90 00:06:17,070 --> 00:06:20,506 sister, or my mom. Um... uh... 91 00:06:20,530 --> 00:06:26,470 This bone, whose bone is this? ♪ ♪ 92 00:06:27,970 --> 00:06:32,076 And they told us that there was no part of a human that was 93 00:06:32,100 --> 00:06:36,900 bigger than a femur that was left. 94 00:06:37,270 --> 00:06:41,876 That whole experience is just a jumble of images and painful 95 00:06:41,900 --> 00:06:46,500 thoughts and blankness, really, to me; I don't really... 96 00:06:47,930 --> 00:06:53,176 I can't really make sense of it. NARRATOR: The crash of 97 00:06:53,200 --> 00:06:57,006 Ethiopian Flight 302 was the second time in five months that 98 00:06:57,030 --> 00:07:04,900 a Boeing 737 MAX had gone down. ♪ ♪ 99 00:07:08,200 --> 00:07:11,506 As families gathered at the crash site, across the world, 100 00:07:11,530 --> 00:07:13,806 reporters at the "New York Times" were investigating what 101 00:07:13,830 --> 00:07:18,446 had been going wrong with Boeing's new commercial jet. 102 00:07:18,470 --> 00:07:22,376 Statistically speaking, the likelihood that these two 103 00:07:22,400 --> 00:07:28,300 accidents were not in some way connected was extremely low. 104 00:07:29,030 --> 00:07:32,606 It suggested that there was something going on with the 105 00:07:32,630 --> 00:07:36,076 plane and obviously we were determined to find out. 106 00:07:36,100 --> 00:07:40,806 ♪ ♪ It was clear from the get-go 107 00:07:40,830 --> 00:07:43,876 that Boeing was in full crisis mode. 108 00:07:43,900 --> 00:07:45,746 As the facts from the accident become available, and 109 00:07:45,770 --> 00:07:49,406 we understand the necessary next steps, we're taking action to 110 00:07:49,430 --> 00:07:53,576 fully reassure airlines and their passengers of the safety 111 00:07:53,600 --> 00:07:56,646 of the 737 MAX. This was going to be an 112 00:07:56,670 --> 00:07:58,776 existential crisis for the company if these two events were 113 00:07:58,800 --> 00:08:02,176 related. China grounds the plane 114 00:08:02,200 --> 00:08:04,706 first. Other international regulators 115 00:08:04,730 --> 00:08:06,706 ground the plane. Then the European Union grounds 116 00:08:06,730 --> 00:08:09,306 the plane. But in the U.S., the F.A.A. 117 00:08:09,330 --> 00:08:11,200 says it's not grounding the plane. 118 00:08:11,570 --> 00:08:14,076 Boeing and the F.A.A. all were saying that they were sort 119 00:08:14,100 --> 00:08:17,246 of waiting for the facts before they rushed to judgment and 120 00:08:17,270 --> 00:08:19,876 grounded such an important new plane. 121 00:08:19,900 --> 00:08:22,676 NARRATOR: But for months, the "Times" was reporting there was 122 00:08:22,700 --> 00:08:27,176 something wrong with the 737 MAX itself... the software system 123 00:08:27,200 --> 00:08:30,976 that pilots had not known existed. 124 00:08:31,000 --> 00:08:34,476 The Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation 125 00:08:34,500 --> 00:08:39,976 System, or MCAS. The function of this previously 126 00:08:40,000 --> 00:08:45,806 undisclosed system was to save the plane, when it believed that 127 00:08:45,830 --> 00:08:49,900 the plane might go into a stall, and fall out of the sky. 128 00:08:50,230 --> 00:08:54,176 And so this system was designed then to sort of take over the 129 00:08:54,200 --> 00:08:58,376 stabilizer and push that nose back down in case the pilot gets 130 00:08:58,400 --> 00:09:03,146 in trouble. NARRATOR: Then a major 131 00:09:03,170 --> 00:09:10,276 setback for the company. Radar showed the two planes' 132 00:09:10,300 --> 00:09:13,270 flight patterns were eerily similar. 133 00:09:14,130 --> 00:09:16,076 Days after the rest of the world had reached the same 134 00:09:16,100 --> 00:09:18,946 conclusion, they finally grounded the plane. 135 00:09:18,970 --> 00:09:21,346 NARRATOR: For the "New York Times" reporters all the signs 136 00:09:21,370 --> 00:09:25,006 pointed to MCAS. We knew that MCAS was the 137 00:09:25,030 --> 00:09:27,576 beginning and we knew that we needed to start with this 138 00:09:27,600 --> 00:09:31,206 system. This was a really problematic 139 00:09:31,230 --> 00:09:35,630 software system in the way it was designed. 140 00:09:36,130 --> 00:09:39,006 Okay, well, then how the hell did it end up in the plane this 141 00:09:39,030 --> 00:09:42,906 way? ♪ ♪ 142 00:09:42,930 --> 00:09:45,946 NARRATOR: Boeing declined to be interviewed for this film. 143 00:09:45,970 --> 00:09:49,506 In a statement, the company said safety is its top priority and 144 00:09:49,530 --> 00:09:52,546 it has worked closely with regulators, investigators, and 145 00:09:52,570 --> 00:09:56,576 stakeholders "to implement changes that ensure accidents 146 00:09:56,600 --> 00:10:03,046 like these never happen again." ♪ ♪ 147 00:10:03,070 --> 00:10:05,770 This story really begins in 2011. 148 00:10:08,670 --> 00:10:12,806 The 2011 Paris Air Show officially opened Monday. 149 00:10:12,830 --> 00:10:15,546 Boeing and Airbus had been going head-to-head for at least 150 00:10:15,570 --> 00:10:17,746 a decade. But Airbus had been quickly 151 00:10:17,770 --> 00:10:21,306 catching up and really nipping at Boeing's heels. 152 00:10:21,330 --> 00:10:24,376 It's the best air show ever for Airbus in terms of aircraft 153 00:10:24,400 --> 00:10:29,306 numbers sold. In 2010, Airbus introduced 154 00:10:29,330 --> 00:10:33,606 the A320neo, a more fuel efficient version of its 155 00:10:33,630 --> 00:10:38,306 stalwart A320. The A320 is the direct 156 00:10:38,330 --> 00:10:43,306 competitor to the Boeing 737. Airlines wanted an airplane that 157 00:10:43,330 --> 00:10:49,776 was more fuel efficient than the airplanes then in service. 158 00:10:49,800 --> 00:10:53,076 Airbus chose to re-engine the A320 into what they call the 159 00:10:53,100 --> 00:10:56,776 Neo, the new engine option. It's a record 200 orders for 160 00:10:56,800 --> 00:10:59,446 its A320neo. It was one of the 161 00:10:59,470 --> 00:11:03,606 fastest-selling programs of aviation history. 162 00:11:03,630 --> 00:11:06,946 And it placed enormous pressure on Boeing to respond. 163 00:11:06,970 --> 00:11:11,406 About 40% of the profits for the entire Boeing Company came 164 00:11:11,430 --> 00:11:16,346 from the 737. The 737 was the best-selling 165 00:11:16,370 --> 00:11:20,676 commercial airplane of all time. The 10,000th 737 aircraft is 166 00:11:20,700 --> 00:11:22,406 going to roll off the assembly line today. 167 00:11:22,430 --> 00:11:24,506 More than 10,000 of these airplanes have been used by 168 00:11:24,530 --> 00:11:27,246 hundreds of airlines all over the globe. 169 00:11:27,270 --> 00:11:30,106 The official 737 christening ceremony took place in the new 170 00:11:30,130 --> 00:11:32,846 final assembly building... What always amazed me is that 171 00:11:32,870 --> 00:11:36,876 the 737 was first introduced when the Beatles were still 172 00:11:36,900 --> 00:11:38,646 together. Right. 173 00:11:38,670 --> 00:11:41,906 January 17, 1967. Flight attendants christened the 174 00:11:41,930 --> 00:11:44,646 first Boeing 737 by smashing champagne bottles over the 175 00:11:44,670 --> 00:11:47,806 wings. ♪ ♪ 176 00:11:47,830 --> 00:11:50,606 It was designed to be very low to the ground. 177 00:11:50,630 --> 00:11:55,106 Now by the 1980s, Boeing had to upgrade the 737, and they 178 00:11:55,130 --> 00:11:59,376 created what was called 737 Classic, which had a new engine 179 00:11:59,400 --> 00:12:03,246 on it. First brand new 737-500... 180 00:12:03,270 --> 00:12:07,446 In the 1990s you had the 737 Next Generation, which had a 181 00:12:07,470 --> 00:12:12,306 new wing on it and some fuselage stretches. 182 00:12:12,330 --> 00:12:17,076 And so here we are in 2011 with the Paris Airshow with the 183 00:12:17,100 --> 00:12:20,806 A320neo and Boeing frankly was caught flat-footed. 184 00:12:20,830 --> 00:12:24,206 Within a couple of weeks, Airbus and American Airlines 185 00:12:24,230 --> 00:12:28,976 have the preliminary workings of what would become the first deal 186 00:12:29,000 --> 00:12:32,946 for American to buy Airbus planes in more than a decade. 187 00:12:32,970 --> 00:12:35,946 Gerard Arpey, the C.E.O. of American Airlines, calls Jim 188 00:12:35,970 --> 00:12:39,606 McNerney, the C.E.O. of Boeing. It's a courtesy call at this 189 00:12:39,630 --> 00:12:42,106 point. Just letting their longtime 190 00:12:42,130 --> 00:12:44,706 supplier of airplanes know they're going to go with the 191 00:12:44,730 --> 00:12:48,706 competition. And that is essentially a 192 00:12:48,730 --> 00:12:54,206 dagger in the heart of Boeing. And within 48 hours, Boeing 193 00:12:54,230 --> 00:12:58,106 had decided to pull the trigger on launching the re-engine 737 194 00:12:58,130 --> 00:13:03,476 which later became branded as the MAX. 195 00:13:03,500 --> 00:13:06,476 From the very beginning, from its birth, it was marked by 196 00:13:06,500 --> 00:13:13,306 competitive pressure. ♪ ♪ 197 00:13:13,330 --> 00:13:15,246 You need to understand what was going on with Boeing at the 198 00:13:15,270 --> 00:13:17,676 time that the MAX program was launched. 199 00:13:17,700 --> 00:13:21,406 Boeing was billions of dollars over-budget on its 787 program, 200 00:13:21,430 --> 00:13:26,046 on its 747-8 program. Airlines were thoroughly ticked 201 00:13:26,070 --> 00:13:28,576 off at Boeing over the delays. And Boeing was looking at the 202 00:13:28,600 --> 00:13:30,870 MAX to restore its own credibility. 203 00:13:32,200 --> 00:13:38,246 ♪ ♪ NARRATOR: Within days of the 204 00:13:38,270 --> 00:13:42,646 second 737 MAX crash, another investigation was underway in 205 00:13:42,670 --> 00:13:46,346 Washington, D.C. We started getting 206 00:13:46,370 --> 00:13:49,076 information in from whistleblowers, from people both 207 00:13:49,100 --> 00:13:53,830 current and former F.A.A. and Boeing employees. 208 00:13:54,470 --> 00:13:56,506 NARRATOR: Doug Pasternak was leading a congressional 209 00:13:56,530 --> 00:13:59,176 investigation. This is the first time he is 210 00:13:59,200 --> 00:14:03,106 speaking publicly about what he found. 211 00:14:03,130 --> 00:14:06,806 As soon as the second accident occurred, we started 212 00:14:06,830 --> 00:14:10,946 our investigation, and our focus was on the design, development, 213 00:14:10,970 --> 00:14:15,806 and certification of the MAX. We got hundreds of thousands of 214 00:14:15,830 --> 00:14:21,446 pages of documents from Boeing. One of the things that really 215 00:14:21,470 --> 00:14:25,876 struck me from speaking to a lot of Boeing employees was that 216 00:14:25,900 --> 00:14:30,646 they were so excited to go to work at Boeing. 217 00:14:30,670 --> 00:14:34,306 Boeing is a tremendous engineering company and a 218 00:14:34,330 --> 00:14:39,506 technical marvel but almost without failure, they point to a 219 00:14:39,530 --> 00:14:45,076 degradation of that mindset. And that safety suffered as a 220 00:14:45,100 --> 00:14:49,376 result. Looking backwards, I think you 221 00:14:49,400 --> 00:14:55,006 can clearly see the trajectory to tragedy, along the way, at 222 00:14:55,030 --> 00:15:01,276 Boeing. ♪ ♪ 223 00:15:01,300 --> 00:15:03,706 NARRATOR: Boeing publicly said the MAX went through a 224 00:15:03,730 --> 00:15:06,946 deliberate six-year development process. 225 00:15:06,970 --> 00:15:10,476 But in their first stories, the "New York Times" reporters found 226 00:15:10,500 --> 00:15:13,906 insiders who said that Boeing executives had been putting the 227 00:15:13,930 --> 00:15:19,846 pressure on to design the new 737 quickly and cheaply. 228 00:15:19,870 --> 00:15:22,546 One specific engineer we spoke to was Rick Ludtke, he 229 00:15:22,570 --> 00:15:25,576 helped design the cockpit in the MAX and he talked a lot about 230 00:15:25,600 --> 00:15:29,100 how there was an obsession in limiting changes. 231 00:15:29,670 --> 00:15:33,076 This program was a much more intense pressure cooker than 232 00:15:33,100 --> 00:15:36,506 I'd ever been in. The company was trying to avoid 233 00:15:36,530 --> 00:15:40,846 costs. Minimum change to simplify the 234 00:15:40,870 --> 00:15:44,846 training differences, and get it done quickly. 235 00:15:44,870 --> 00:15:48,776 That put what had happened in the context of this broader 236 00:15:48,800 --> 00:15:50,300 corporate narrative. Yeah. 237 00:15:52,300 --> 00:15:54,706 Speed was what they seemed to desire. 238 00:15:54,730 --> 00:15:57,706 There was a lot of decision-making that was 239 00:15:57,730 --> 00:16:01,776 somewhat arbitrary and didn't involve as much of the, what 240 00:16:01,800 --> 00:16:06,706 engineering considers healthy, um, debate. 241 00:16:06,730 --> 00:16:11,446 The challenge to the Boeing designers was that any designs 242 00:16:11,470 --> 00:16:15,176 we create would not drive any new training that required a 243 00:16:15,200 --> 00:16:19,046 simulator. NARRATOR: In his recorded 244 00:16:19,070 --> 00:16:21,746 interview with the "Times," Ludtke said Boeing management 245 00:16:21,770 --> 00:16:25,306 was so determined to avoid the expense of new training, they 246 00:16:25,330 --> 00:16:28,806 made a bold promise. Sales had made a commitment 247 00:16:28,830 --> 00:16:32,806 with Southwest that for any airplane they delivered that had 248 00:16:32,830 --> 00:16:36,776 a new Level D differences training, Boeing would pay the 249 00:16:36,800 --> 00:16:39,970 company $1 million per every airplane delivered. 250 00:16:40,430 --> 00:16:45,046 If the MAX required simulator training, it would rebate 251 00:16:45,070 --> 00:16:50,376 Southwest a million dollars per plane. 252 00:16:50,400 --> 00:16:53,076 And there's that incentive. That's why it was so important 253 00:16:53,100 --> 00:16:55,830 to Boeing that pilot training be kept to a minimum. 254 00:16:56,700 --> 00:17:01,746 All of this comes out of trying to give airlines the most 255 00:17:01,770 --> 00:17:06,106 fuel-efficient version of a plane that they can spend as 256 00:17:06,130 --> 00:17:08,746 little money training their pilots on. 257 00:17:08,770 --> 00:17:13,876 ♪ ♪ That meant Boeing had to do a 258 00:17:13,900 --> 00:17:17,106 number of things to make this plane fly like the old one and 259 00:17:17,130 --> 00:17:22,246 that was because the MAX had much bigger engines on it to 260 00:17:22,270 --> 00:17:25,776 make them more fuel efficient. But because the 737 was a 261 00:17:25,800 --> 00:17:30,346 50-year-old airplane at this time practically, when it came 262 00:17:30,370 --> 00:17:34,576 time for Boeing to put those engines on the wings, the 263 00:17:34,600 --> 00:17:37,746 engines were so darn big, they had to mount them further 264 00:17:37,770 --> 00:17:42,476 forward on the wings. They were testing in this 265 00:17:42,500 --> 00:17:44,606 wind tunnel, and they were discovering the plane was 266 00:17:44,630 --> 00:17:46,906 handling just a little bit differently. 267 00:17:46,930 --> 00:17:48,776 But they didn't even have a plane built yet, so this wasn't, 268 00:17:48,800 --> 00:17:50,706 you know, happening in real flight. 269 00:17:50,730 --> 00:17:52,676 This is something you have to fix. 270 00:17:52,700 --> 00:17:58,006 And they leaned on a system that they had used once before in a 271 00:17:58,030 --> 00:18:02,146 military tanker. It was designed as a system on 272 00:18:02,170 --> 00:18:07,906 the plane to really just smooth out the way the plane handled. 273 00:18:07,930 --> 00:18:12,876 NARRATOR: It was MCAS. It was designed for these 274 00:18:12,900 --> 00:18:17,746 extremely unusual maneuvers. Situations that hopefully the 275 00:18:17,770 --> 00:18:21,846 plane would never get in. And to prevent the nose from 276 00:18:21,870 --> 00:18:25,746 getting too high, the system would move the stabilizer on the 277 00:18:25,770 --> 00:18:29,200 back of the plane to push the nose back down. 278 00:18:33,270 --> 00:18:35,206 NARRATOR: But inside Boeing, there were early signs of 279 00:18:35,230 --> 00:18:38,206 trouble. One of the first documents we 280 00:18:38,230 --> 00:18:46,230 found was from November of 2012. A Boeing test pilot was flying 281 00:18:46,530 --> 00:18:52,706 the MAX in a flight simulator and trying to respond to an 282 00:18:52,730 --> 00:18:56,906 activation of MCAS. And that resulted in what he 283 00:18:56,930 --> 00:19:02,776 described as a catastrophic event. 284 00:19:02,800 --> 00:19:06,046 It showed that if that had been in real life, he could have lost 285 00:19:06,070 --> 00:19:09,446 the airplane. They realize from that moment on 286 00:19:09,470 --> 00:19:16,106 even a Boeing test pilot may have trouble responding to MCAS. 287 00:19:16,130 --> 00:19:18,606 NARRATOR: The company kept quiet about the simulator 288 00:19:18,630 --> 00:19:23,376 experience and appeared to have discounted the test results. 289 00:19:23,400 --> 00:19:27,846 Still, in the following months, some Boeing employees suggested 290 00:19:27,870 --> 00:19:33,406 simply removing all references to MCAS from training manuals. 291 00:19:33,430 --> 00:19:37,006 Boeing, from almost the very beginning, realized the 292 00:19:37,030 --> 00:19:43,846 significance of MCAS, and the significance MCAS would have on 293 00:19:43,870 --> 00:19:48,906 pilot simulator training. "If we emphasize MCAS is a new 294 00:19:48,930 --> 00:19:53,646 function, there may be a greater certification and training 295 00:19:53,670 --> 00:19:57,146 impact. Recommended action: investigate 296 00:19:57,170 --> 00:20:04,106 deletion of MCAS nomenclature." What that meant was that if they 297 00:20:04,130 --> 00:20:08,206 said MCAS was a new function, the F.A.A. was going to 298 00:20:08,230 --> 00:20:13,076 scrutinize it a lot more. ♪ ♪ 299 00:20:13,100 --> 00:20:15,246 NARRATOR: Boeing told Congress it kept the F.A.A. 300 00:20:15,270 --> 00:20:20,276 informed about MCAS' development and final configuration. 301 00:20:20,300 --> 00:20:23,546 But Boeing has a complex and close relationship with the 302 00:20:23,570 --> 00:20:28,046 agency that oversees it. The airplanes are part of the 303 00:20:28,070 --> 00:20:31,306 story, but so are the regulators. 304 00:20:31,330 --> 00:20:38,676 The F.A.A. regulated Boeing, in part, with a handful of Boeing 305 00:20:38,700 --> 00:20:44,306 employees, whose paychecks came from Boeing, but whose jobs were 306 00:20:44,330 --> 00:20:51,546 to represent the interests of the F.A.A. 307 00:20:51,570 --> 00:20:54,106 NARRATOR: It's a decades-old arrangement known as 308 00:20:54,130 --> 00:20:57,676 "delegation" that allows federal agencies to give 309 00:20:57,700 --> 00:21:01,506 oversight powers to the companies they regulate. 310 00:21:01,530 --> 00:21:05,076 In the beginning, there was a really good reason for this. 311 00:21:05,100 --> 00:21:10,846 The F.A.A. was certifying things that made no sense to have them 312 00:21:10,870 --> 00:21:15,576 certify every single exit sign or bathroom sign or paint. 313 00:21:15,600 --> 00:21:19,646 The issue that many of the F.A.A. employees that we talked 314 00:21:19,670 --> 00:21:25,206 to had was that it went way beyond bathroom signs. 315 00:21:25,230 --> 00:21:32,106 Over time, Congress passed laws that pushed the F.A.A. to hand 316 00:21:32,130 --> 00:21:36,676 over the responsibility for more and more tasks to the company, 317 00:21:36,700 --> 00:21:39,946 to Boeing. With this level of delegation 318 00:21:39,970 --> 00:21:43,406 between the company and the F.A.A., it became hard to 319 00:21:43,430 --> 00:21:46,776 understand who was working for who. 320 00:21:46,800 --> 00:21:51,600 There was one key person inside the F.A.A.: Ali Bahrami. 321 00:21:52,270 --> 00:21:57,976 I'm Ali Bahrami, my job at the F.A.A. is to lead and manage 322 00:21:58,000 --> 00:22:02,446 aviation safety organization. NARRATOR: In the midst of a 323 00:22:02,470 --> 00:22:06,506 long career at the F.A.A., Ali Bahrami had left to spend four 324 00:22:06,530 --> 00:22:09,706 years as a lobbyist for the Aerospace Industries 325 00:22:09,730 --> 00:22:12,606 Association. While he's in that lobbying 326 00:22:12,630 --> 00:22:14,976 role, he says, "We urge the F.A.A..." 327 00:22:15,000 --> 00:22:18,276 We urge the F.A.A. to allow greater use of delegation not 328 00:22:18,300 --> 00:22:22,276 only to take full advantage of industry expertise but to 329 00:22:22,300 --> 00:22:27,046 increase the collaboration that improves aviation safety. 330 00:22:27,070 --> 00:22:31,076 So here's the guy who would ultimately lead the F.A.A.'s 331 00:22:31,100 --> 00:22:35,376 safety operation, encouraging the F.A.A. to let industry do as 332 00:22:35,400 --> 00:22:38,476 much of its certification work as possible. 333 00:22:38,500 --> 00:22:41,476 ♪ ♪ NARRATOR: Neither Ali Bahrami 334 00:22:41,500 --> 00:22:45,046 nor the F.A.A. would agree to an interview, but former F.A.A. 335 00:22:45,070 --> 00:22:49,046 administrator Michael Huerta spoke to us about delegation and 336 00:22:49,070 --> 00:22:52,776 the relationship between the agency and Boeing. 337 00:22:52,800 --> 00:22:56,446 There are those that believe it is the fox guarding the 338 00:22:56,470 --> 00:23:00,046 henhouse. Here is why it's not. 339 00:23:00,070 --> 00:23:04,546 The company has an organization whose responsibility is to 340 00:23:04,570 --> 00:23:10,446 ensure that it is in compliance with the standards that are set 341 00:23:10,470 --> 00:23:13,906 by the F.A.A. and it has a level of independence from the 342 00:23:13,930 --> 00:23:17,300 entities that they're overseeing. 343 00:23:17,770 --> 00:23:22,276 What that gets back at is the issue of trust, and 344 00:23:22,300 --> 00:23:28,076 transparency, because the whole regulatory framework, and the 345 00:23:28,100 --> 00:23:32,746 whole delegation process is premised upon a notion that 346 00:23:32,770 --> 00:23:39,176 everyone is going to share their knowledge and their expertise 347 00:23:39,200 --> 00:23:43,006 with one another. NARRATOR: In the design of 348 00:23:43,030 --> 00:23:47,076 the 737 MAX, many things would be delegated to Boeing. 349 00:23:47,100 --> 00:23:52,776 That included MCAS. Under the impression that 350 00:23:52,800 --> 00:23:57,376 this was a relatively benign system, the F.A.A. agreed to 351 00:23:57,400 --> 00:24:01,246 delegate it, as is the custom with the F.A.A. and Boeing, and 352 00:24:01,270 --> 00:24:03,776 that's what happened in this case. 353 00:24:03,800 --> 00:24:10,206 It handed it over. ♪ ♪ 354 00:24:10,230 --> 00:24:12,806 NARRATOR: In a statement, the F.A.A. blamed ineffective 355 00:24:12,830 --> 00:24:16,676 coordination, and said it had not focused on MCAS when it 356 00:24:16,700 --> 00:24:20,246 certified the MAX because Boeing had not identified MCAS as 357 00:24:20,270 --> 00:24:23,706 significant. Congress has ordered the agency 358 00:24:23,730 --> 00:24:26,876 to revise the delegation process. 359 00:24:26,900 --> 00:24:33,146 ♪ ♪ After years of going through 360 00:24:33,170 --> 00:24:37,776 design and development, the 737 MAX prototype was rolled out of 361 00:24:37,800 --> 00:24:41,346 Boeing's Renton factory for its maiden flight. 362 00:24:41,370 --> 00:24:43,246 Look at all the excited faces, they wouldn't miss it. 363 00:24:43,270 --> 00:24:46,406 Ed Wilson is in the cockpit, he's the new chief pilot, and he 364 00:24:46,430 --> 00:24:48,806 takes off. And let's just take a listen 365 00:24:48,830 --> 00:24:51,070 as this airplane gets ready for its very first takeoff. 366 00:24:53,900 --> 00:24:58,676 (cheers and applause) A short time after this first 367 00:24:58,700 --> 00:25:02,106 maiden flight, Ed Wilson, he and his co-pilots start to realize 368 00:25:02,130 --> 00:25:07,846 that the 737 MAX is not handling as smoothly as it should in 369 00:25:07,870 --> 00:25:11,106 certain low-speed situations. It's shortly after takeoff. 370 00:25:11,130 --> 00:25:13,106 You know, it's still kind of climbing to ascent. 371 00:25:13,130 --> 00:25:15,876 It's not going full speed. NARRATOR: Boeing engineers 372 00:25:15,900 --> 00:25:18,776 had an idea for how to deal with this. 373 00:25:18,800 --> 00:25:22,706 They know about MCAS and they know that MCAS was actually used 374 00:25:22,730 --> 00:25:27,606 for a similar situation in these high-speed maneuvers, and so 375 00:25:27,630 --> 00:25:33,006 theoretically, MCAS could also be used in these other 376 00:25:33,030 --> 00:25:35,546 situations to also smooth out the handling. 377 00:25:35,570 --> 00:25:38,106 Crucially, it's already been created. 378 00:25:38,130 --> 00:25:40,946 It's already been approved. And it's something that we could 379 00:25:40,970 --> 00:25:45,206 just apply, you know, to a different phase of flight. 380 00:25:45,230 --> 00:25:52,306 It's actually a pretty easy fix. This ends up being an extremely 381 00:25:52,330 --> 00:25:56,446 fateful decision. They enable the stabilizer to 382 00:25:56,470 --> 00:26:00,046 move much more, actually four times as much. 383 00:26:00,070 --> 00:26:02,806 Now the system is designed for low-speed situations like just 384 00:26:02,830 --> 00:26:06,606 after takeoff. And after takeoff is when the 385 00:26:06,630 --> 00:26:10,476 plane is still only a few thousand feet over the ground, 386 00:26:10,500 --> 00:26:13,876 that means you have much less room for error. 387 00:26:13,900 --> 00:26:17,876 It's happening in an automated fashion and a repeated fashion. 388 00:26:17,900 --> 00:26:23,606 This fundamentally changes MCAS. It makes it much more 389 00:26:23,630 --> 00:26:27,806 aggressive, much more risky. It's a far more dangerous 390 00:26:27,830 --> 00:26:31,676 system. ♪ ♪ 391 00:26:31,700 --> 00:26:34,506 NARRATOR: Boeing was doubling down on the system, expanding 392 00:26:34,530 --> 00:26:38,176 it, despite the earlier catastrophic result in a 393 00:26:38,200 --> 00:26:42,476 simulator test. The "Times'" reporting on MCAS 394 00:26:42,500 --> 00:26:45,946 focused on a former Boeing pilot. 395 00:26:45,970 --> 00:26:50,776 I started to hear about a pilot at Boeing whose name was 396 00:26:50,800 --> 00:26:53,346 Mark Forkner. He came up through the Air Force 397 00:26:53,370 --> 00:26:56,576 Academy. He flew for Alaska Airlines. 398 00:26:56,600 --> 00:27:00,806 And he became the chief technical pilot for the 737. 399 00:27:00,830 --> 00:27:06,576 He had played a definitive role in making sure that there was 400 00:27:06,600 --> 00:27:13,346 minimal pilot training on the MAX. 401 00:27:13,370 --> 00:27:16,176 Boeing released to our committee instant messages and 402 00:27:16,200 --> 00:27:19,870 emails from Mark Forkner and some of his colleagues. 403 00:27:21,030 --> 00:27:26,946 In one of these emails that Mark Forkner sent out, he says, "I 404 00:27:26,970 --> 00:27:31,206 want to stress the importance of holding firm that there will 405 00:27:31,230 --> 00:27:35,576 not be any type of simulator training required to transition 406 00:27:35,600 --> 00:27:39,506 to MAX." And he said, "Boeing will not 407 00:27:39,530 --> 00:27:44,146 allow that to happen." He was this key liaison 408 00:27:44,170 --> 00:27:47,146 between the company and the F.A.A. 409 00:27:47,170 --> 00:27:53,206 He was the person who personally emailed the F.A.A. 410 00:27:53,230 --> 00:27:56,970 asking for MCAS to be removed from the pilot manual. 411 00:27:59,900 --> 00:28:04,076 That was an important piece of this because we understood that 412 00:28:04,100 --> 00:28:10,346 the F.A.A. really didn't know that MCAS became more powerful. 413 00:28:10,370 --> 00:28:14,006 He was speaking, absolutely, on behalf of the company... this 414 00:28:14,030 --> 00:28:17,506 was not some low level employee. And he was asking for something 415 00:28:17,530 --> 00:28:20,546 that was really quite substantial: that a new piece of 416 00:28:20,570 --> 00:28:24,046 software that made the plane behave in ways that it 417 00:28:24,070 --> 00:28:27,506 previously hadn't, be concealed from the pilots. 418 00:28:27,530 --> 00:28:31,546 This is where the commercial pressures from the executive 419 00:28:31,570 --> 00:28:37,006 level come right down to the development of the airplane. 420 00:28:37,030 --> 00:28:40,506 ♪ ♪ Mark Forkner certainly was 421 00:28:40,530 --> 00:28:44,576 not a lone actor in what he did. He was following through on a 422 00:28:44,600 --> 00:28:50,976 policy by Boeing to ensure that the program did not have to put 423 00:28:51,000 --> 00:28:54,906 pilots in a flight simulator. It got to the point where 424 00:28:54,930 --> 00:29:02,246 Mark Forkner got an award for keeping training on the 737 MAX 425 00:29:02,270 --> 00:29:06,246 to a minimum. NARRATOR: Nearly eight months 426 00:29:06,270 --> 00:29:09,246 after requesting that MCAS be removed from pilot training 427 00:29:09,270 --> 00:29:12,446 manuals, Forkner texted a colleague with a shocking 428 00:29:12,470 --> 00:29:16,406 realization. This appears to be the moment 429 00:29:16,430 --> 00:29:21,076 where Mark Forkner learns that MCAS has been expanded. 430 00:29:21,100 --> 00:29:23,676 He writes in that message, "I basically lied to the 431 00:29:23,700 --> 00:29:26,946 regulators, unknowingly." But he never went back and 432 00:29:26,970 --> 00:29:30,576 corrected the record. He never went back and fixed the 433 00:29:30,600 --> 00:29:36,306 error. NARRATOR: Mark Forkner 434 00:29:36,330 --> 00:29:38,506 wouldn't speak to us but his lawyer told the "Times" 435 00:29:38,530 --> 00:29:41,046 reporters that his communications with the F.A.A. 436 00:29:41,070 --> 00:29:44,106 were honest and that "he would never jeopardize the safety of 437 00:29:44,130 --> 00:29:46,570 other pilots or their passengers." 438 00:29:47,700 --> 00:29:52,106 ♪ ♪ When Boeing engineers expanded 439 00:29:52,130 --> 00:29:55,506 the MCAS system, they included a feature that would make it 440 00:29:55,530 --> 00:29:59,576 particularly dangerous. Planes have millions of parts 441 00:29:59,600 --> 00:30:02,646 in them. And there's one little one on 442 00:30:02,670 --> 00:30:06,576 the 737 that sticks out of the fuselage. 443 00:30:06,600 --> 00:30:09,946 See that little black circle there, that is called... 444 00:30:09,970 --> 00:30:14,146 The angle of attack sensor. NARRATOR: On the 737 MAX, it 445 00:30:14,170 --> 00:30:19,246 had the power to trigger MCAS. It's the A.O.A. sensor that 446 00:30:19,270 --> 00:30:25,246 is one of the crucial parameters to the computer to tell the 447 00:30:25,270 --> 00:30:28,670 plane that it's in a perilous condition. 448 00:30:29,830 --> 00:30:33,176 The angle of attack sensor would activate MCAS by telling 449 00:30:33,200 --> 00:30:36,806 the system that the plane's nose was too high and then MCAS would 450 00:30:36,830 --> 00:30:41,406 try to push the nose down. But if this sensor is broken, 451 00:30:41,430 --> 00:30:48,206 for whatever reason, MCAS never realizes and so it keeps pushing 452 00:30:48,230 --> 00:30:54,846 the nose of the plane down over and over again. 453 00:30:54,870 --> 00:30:57,106 NARRATOR: Congressional investigators would later find 454 00:30:57,130 --> 00:30:59,746 documents showing that Boeing engineers had raised this very 455 00:30:59,770 --> 00:31:03,546 concern. An engineer asked, "What if 456 00:31:03,570 --> 00:31:08,076 we have a faulty A.O.A. sensor," because A.O.A. sensors are known 457 00:31:08,100 --> 00:31:10,846 to be faulty. You know, what happens to the 458 00:31:10,870 --> 00:31:14,576 airplane? So you have those concerns 459 00:31:14,600 --> 00:31:19,546 raised and the response is again from Boeing engineers was to 460 00:31:19,570 --> 00:31:23,606 essentially dismiss those. ♪ ♪ 461 00:31:23,630 --> 00:31:28,906 Three, two, one! NARRATOR: Boeing began 462 00:31:28,930 --> 00:31:32,376 delivering the new 737 MAX in mid-2017. 463 00:31:32,400 --> 00:31:37,476 At the outset, 737 MAX was arguably one of Boeing's biggest 464 00:31:37,500 --> 00:31:39,906 successes. It had become its best-selling 465 00:31:39,930 --> 00:31:42,446 jet ever. NARRATOR: Advanced sales were 466 00:31:42,470 --> 00:31:48,346 estimated at $370 billion. American had orders for 100. 467 00:31:48,370 --> 00:31:52,606 Southwest Airlines for 200. Boeing had focused especially 468 00:31:52,630 --> 00:31:56,246 hard on selling to developing markets in Asia, where Lion 469 00:31:56,270 --> 00:32:00,606 Air's parent company became the first customer to fly the 737 470 00:32:00,630 --> 00:32:06,506 MAX, signing an agreement worth more than $20 billion. 471 00:32:06,530 --> 00:32:08,676 Airlines loved it. There was a years-long waiting 472 00:32:08,700 --> 00:32:13,446 list to get one. But Boeing's signature new 473 00:32:13,470 --> 00:32:18,146 jet had a fatal flaw. ♪ ♪ 474 00:32:18,170 --> 00:32:20,406 Breaking news. The search for wreckage is 475 00:32:20,430 --> 00:32:24,676 underway after a passenger jet with 189 people on board 476 00:32:24,700 --> 00:32:27,806 crashed. A Lion Air Boeing 737... 477 00:32:27,830 --> 00:32:30,806 A nearly brand-new 737 MAX... NARRATOR: Investigators from 478 00:32:30,830 --> 00:32:33,506 the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board contributed to an 479 00:32:33,530 --> 00:32:36,500 analysis of what led to the Lion Air crash. 480 00:32:36,930 --> 00:32:40,976 Leading up to the Lion Air accident, the angle of attack 481 00:32:41,000 --> 00:32:45,606 probe itself was miscalibrated. The maintenance crew was not 482 00:32:45,630 --> 00:32:50,246 able to properly identify this miscalibration. 483 00:32:50,270 --> 00:32:53,706 The angle of attack sensor sent bad data to MCAS. 484 00:32:53,730 --> 00:32:55,776 The plane thought it was in a stall because of bad 485 00:32:55,800 --> 00:32:58,106 information. And as a consequence of this 486 00:32:58,130 --> 00:33:03,506 angle of attack data error, the MCAS activated when it really 487 00:33:03,530 --> 00:33:10,276 shouldn't have. ♪ ♪ 488 00:33:10,300 --> 00:33:12,846 Five months later, almost the exact same thing happens halfway 489 00:33:12,870 --> 00:33:17,106 across the world. New 737 MAX-8 jetliner 490 00:33:17,130 --> 00:33:19,606 crashed today. Investigators say that flight 491 00:33:19,630 --> 00:33:22,406 had similar problems to the Lion Air crash. 492 00:33:22,430 --> 00:33:25,746 Once again the angle of attack sensor is malfunctioning. 493 00:33:25,770 --> 00:33:28,176 There is this question now about systems within the 494 00:33:28,200 --> 00:33:30,476 aircraft. If MCAS hadn't been on those 495 00:33:30,500 --> 00:33:33,076 planes, those planes wouldn't have crashed. 496 00:33:33,100 --> 00:33:36,576 It's that simple. The world mourns 157 people 497 00:33:36,600 --> 00:33:38,600 killed in the Sunday crash. ♪ ♪ 498 00:33:43,470 --> 00:33:48,576 On the flight of 737 MAX crash, we... we lost five of our 499 00:33:48,600 --> 00:33:53,076 family members. We had our mom, Ann Karanja, our 500 00:33:53,100 --> 00:33:58,776 dear sister, Caroline Karanja. Her three kids, Ryan Njoroge, 501 00:33:58,800 --> 00:34:06,176 Kelli Wanjiku, and Rubi Wangui. ♪ ♪ 502 00:34:06,200 --> 00:34:08,846 It's not like there is a manual of how you need to react, you're 503 00:34:08,870 --> 00:34:12,206 just there, it's like motionless. 504 00:34:12,230 --> 00:34:16,976 You just feel infuriated by anyone and everyone at that 505 00:34:17,000 --> 00:34:21,146 point. I remember the Boeing Company 506 00:34:21,170 --> 00:34:25,606 blaming what they call the foreign pilots and deflecting 507 00:34:25,630 --> 00:34:29,976 blame to... to them, saying they are the cause. 508 00:34:30,000 --> 00:34:35,806 ♪ ♪ All of us at Boeing are 509 00:34:35,830 --> 00:34:39,106 deeply sorry for the loss of life in the Ethiopian Airlines 510 00:34:39,130 --> 00:34:44,446 Flight 302 and Lion Air Flight 610 accidents. 511 00:34:44,470 --> 00:34:46,706 NARRATOR: Boeing C.E.O. Dennis Muilenburg latched onto 512 00:34:46,730 --> 00:34:50,546 findings that inexperience and lack of training were part of a 513 00:34:50,570 --> 00:34:53,646 chain of events that led to the crashes. 514 00:34:53,670 --> 00:34:57,146 It was a controversial position. Understand that these 515 00:34:57,170 --> 00:34:59,706 airplanes are flown in the hands of pilots and in some cases our 516 00:34:59,730 --> 00:35:02,806 system safety analysis includes not only the engineering design 517 00:35:02,830 --> 00:35:08,576 but also the actions that pilots would take as part of a failure 518 00:35:08,600 --> 00:35:10,876 scenario. Boeing's contention from the 519 00:35:10,900 --> 00:35:15,546 beginning was that even though the pilots did not know that 520 00:35:15,570 --> 00:35:20,930 MCAS existed, that they did not need to know that. 521 00:35:21,500 --> 00:35:24,576 And in some cases, those procedures were not completely 522 00:35:24,600 --> 00:35:27,106 followed. Boeing believed that the 523 00:35:27,130 --> 00:35:30,676 pilot should have been able to realize that it was very similar 524 00:35:30,700 --> 00:35:34,546 to a runaway stabilizer situation. 525 00:35:34,570 --> 00:35:37,576 NARRATOR: Runaway stabilizer is an aviation term for a 526 00:35:37,600 --> 00:35:41,976 malfunctioning stabilizer. After the Lion Air crash, Boeing 527 00:35:42,000 --> 00:35:46,276 had issued a directive to pilots to be aware of this possibility, 528 00:35:46,300 --> 00:35:49,646 and told them what to do if it happened. 529 00:35:49,670 --> 00:35:53,306 When that part of the tail was not acting the way that it 530 00:35:53,330 --> 00:35:56,076 should be, you take manual control of it. 531 00:35:56,100 --> 00:35:58,606 The pilots could have stopped their rollercoaster ride by 532 00:35:58,630 --> 00:36:02,006 turning these two switches off. To shut off power to the 533 00:36:02,030 --> 00:36:04,676 stabilizer, you stop it from moving on its own. 534 00:36:04,700 --> 00:36:08,446 And then you start cranking a wheel in the cockpit that 535 00:36:08,470 --> 00:36:12,476 literally will manually move the stabilizer back to where you 536 00:36:12,500 --> 00:36:16,406 want it to move. The issue was, were there 537 00:36:16,430 --> 00:36:19,846 things happening inside the cockpit that might have made 538 00:36:19,870 --> 00:36:25,106 that harder to do. That's what we were asking. 539 00:36:25,130 --> 00:36:29,806 ♪ ♪ When we finally got the 540 00:36:29,830 --> 00:36:34,046 preliminary black box data from the Ethiopian crash, we called 541 00:36:34,070 --> 00:36:39,246 up Dennis Tajer, an American Airlines 737 pilot, and sent him 542 00:36:39,270 --> 00:36:42,630 the data, and we read through it together. 543 00:36:43,070 --> 00:36:47,406 My mission was to provide them, I'm in the cockpit, I see 544 00:36:47,430 --> 00:36:53,546 what's happening now. So we walk through each line and 545 00:36:53,570 --> 00:36:56,876 I had no idea what was in it. I knew that the crew had an 546 00:36:56,900 --> 00:37:01,300 experienced captain and a lesser experienced first officer. 547 00:37:02,670 --> 00:37:07,376 We go, second by second, through these few minutes of 548 00:37:07,400 --> 00:37:10,706 this flight. Going through the steps that 549 00:37:10,730 --> 00:37:14,106 the pilots had taken and saying, "Yup, I would have done that. 550 00:37:14,130 --> 00:37:18,046 Yup, I would have done that." And as soon as they lift off 551 00:37:18,070 --> 00:37:21,246 the ground, all these different alerts started popping up. 552 00:37:21,270 --> 00:37:24,076 The airspeed was unreliable, the altitude was showing unreliable, 553 00:37:24,100 --> 00:37:27,576 there were alerts related to that, but they bring the gear up 554 00:37:27,600 --> 00:37:31,676 and they continue to climb out. NARRATOR: Two minutes into 555 00:37:31,700 --> 00:37:35,776 the flight, based on faulty data from the A.O.A. sensor, MCAS 556 00:37:35,800 --> 00:37:39,076 kicked in, and began pushing the nose down. 557 00:37:39,100 --> 00:37:41,800 Don't sync. And I have... 558 00:37:45,230 --> 00:37:52,606 A very clear memory of noting a time mark where the first 559 00:37:52,630 --> 00:37:57,846 officer is quoted as saying, "Stab trim cutout switches," 560 00:37:57,870 --> 00:38:00,976 which takes the weapon away from MCAS, which is what Boeing told 561 00:38:01,000 --> 00:38:08,776 us to do. But I have to confess... 562 00:38:08,800 --> 00:38:12,306 I probably swore, I said, "The kid got it right. 563 00:38:12,330 --> 00:38:16,746 The kid got it right." What had happened was the 564 00:38:16,770 --> 00:38:21,006 pilots did do what they were supposed to do, they had cut the 565 00:38:21,030 --> 00:38:24,406 electricity off. Don't sync. 566 00:38:24,430 --> 00:38:26,906 They hit these switches, and they tried to take manual 567 00:38:26,930 --> 00:38:30,076 control. The first officer is reaching 568 00:38:30,100 --> 00:38:33,446 to this large wheel on his left and that's the manual trim wheel 569 00:38:33,470 --> 00:38:37,876 and trying to turn it. It's like lifting up a ten-ton 570 00:38:37,900 --> 00:38:40,976 bucket of cement out of a deep well. 571 00:38:41,000 --> 00:38:43,706 The problem was, at that point, the plane was going so 572 00:38:43,730 --> 00:38:50,176 fast that even after they took manual control, they could not 573 00:38:50,200 --> 00:38:54,006 physically get the plane to right itself. 574 00:38:54,030 --> 00:38:56,446 They shouldn't have been going that fast. 575 00:38:56,470 --> 00:38:58,246 Too low. Terrain. 576 00:38:58,270 --> 00:39:02,376 And they're continuing to accelerate towards the ground. 577 00:39:02,400 --> 00:39:05,806 The ground is approaching them. NARRATOR: Then, with no 578 00:39:05,830 --> 00:39:08,546 apparent recourse, the pilots reached for the stabilizer 579 00:39:08,570 --> 00:39:12,746 switches. I'm yelling into the cockpit, 580 00:39:12,770 --> 00:39:15,406 "Don't do that!" But I don't know what they're 581 00:39:15,430 --> 00:39:18,106 facing. NARRATOR: MCAS was 582 00:39:18,130 --> 00:39:19,746 reactivated. Pull up. 583 00:39:19,770 --> 00:39:22,576 MCAS says, "Hey, I'm back on, here we go." 584 00:39:22,600 --> 00:39:25,706 (imitates whirring) And now the airplane is in near 585 00:39:25,730 --> 00:39:31,146 full nose down trim and you can pull back forever and there's 586 00:39:31,170 --> 00:39:34,006 not enough metal in the back of the airplane to make that 587 00:39:34,030 --> 00:39:36,906 airplane come up to a nose-up. Terrain. 588 00:39:36,930 --> 00:39:38,876 Terrain. Pull up. 589 00:39:38,900 --> 00:39:40,930 Pull up. (echoing): Pull up. 590 00:39:42,370 --> 00:39:50,370 (birds twittering) She died when she was 24. 591 00:39:51,400 --> 00:39:57,300 It's unbearable that she's not with us. 592 00:39:57,700 --> 00:40:04,206 And the only thing I can do is try to prevent this for other 593 00:40:04,230 --> 00:40:08,676 people. NARRATOR: About four months 594 00:40:08,700 --> 00:40:12,506 after the Ethiopian Airlines crash, the family of Samya Stumo 595 00:40:12,530 --> 00:40:16,876 was about to receive news they would find bewildering. 596 00:40:16,900 --> 00:40:19,576 We were eating dinner and I hadn't looked at my phone for a 597 00:40:19,600 --> 00:40:23,406 long time. And it was blowing up. 598 00:40:23,430 --> 00:40:27,306 We are joined today by Ali Bahrami, the associate 599 00:40:27,330 --> 00:40:31,346 administrator for Aviation Safety. 600 00:40:31,370 --> 00:40:33,576 Chairman Collins, Ranking Member... 601 00:40:33,600 --> 00:40:36,676 There were families from Kenya, from Ethiopia, from all 602 00:40:36,700 --> 00:40:39,770 over saying, "Who is this Ali Bahrami?" 603 00:40:40,870 --> 00:40:43,146 We continue to evaluate Boeing's software modification 604 00:40:43,170 --> 00:40:46,506 to the MCAS. NARRATOR: The F.A.A.'s Ali 605 00:40:46,530 --> 00:40:49,446 Bahrami had been called before Congress, where he was 606 00:40:49,470 --> 00:40:52,576 questioned about revelations the F.A.A. had known there was a 607 00:40:52,600 --> 00:40:57,646 risk of another MAX crashing... After Lion Air. 608 00:40:57,670 --> 00:41:04,146 If the agency's own analysis found MCAS to be an unacceptable 609 00:41:04,170 --> 00:41:11,446 risk, why did the F.A.A. not take immediate action to address 610 00:41:11,470 --> 00:41:14,546 those risks? The families hadn't known 611 00:41:14,570 --> 00:41:16,976 that before. They didn't know that the safety 612 00:41:17,000 --> 00:41:21,306 agency gambled with passenger lives. 613 00:41:21,330 --> 00:41:25,076 We knew that eventual solution would be to have the 614 00:41:25,100 --> 00:41:27,606 modification. And based on our risk 615 00:41:27,630 --> 00:41:31,146 assessment, we felt that this... we had sufficient time to be 616 00:41:31,170 --> 00:41:35,906 able to do the modification, you know, and-and get the final 617 00:41:35,930 --> 00:41:38,806 fix. NARRATOR: After the Lion Air 618 00:41:38,830 --> 00:41:43,076 crash, the F.A.A. had conducted an analysis of the likelihood of 619 00:41:43,100 --> 00:41:48,506 another 737 MAX crashing. The worst-case scenario was 620 00:41:48,530 --> 00:41:51,606 grim. They looked at the 621 00:41:51,630 --> 00:41:58,576 probability that there could be another crash of a 737 MAX, if 622 00:41:58,600 --> 00:42:03,206 the F.A.A. didn't do anything to MCAS and just let the plane keep 623 00:42:03,230 --> 00:42:06,806 flying. And what that assessment showed 624 00:42:06,830 --> 00:42:12,806 was that F.A.A. predicted there could potentially be 15 more 625 00:42:12,830 --> 00:42:18,176 fatal accidents of 737 MAX aircraft over the lifespan of 626 00:42:18,200 --> 00:42:24,276 the fleet, about one crash, every other year. 627 00:42:24,300 --> 00:42:27,606 NARRATOR: But in explaining its decision not to ground the 628 00:42:27,630 --> 00:42:31,276 plane, the F.A.A. said in its statement that the actual risk 629 00:42:31,300 --> 00:42:35,006 at the time... considering the number of planes in the air... 630 00:42:35,030 --> 00:42:40,506 Was as close to zero as their calculations allowed. 631 00:42:40,530 --> 00:42:44,546 The agency had given Boeing 150 days to fix MCAS and issued 632 00:42:44,570 --> 00:42:49,476 official directives to pilots. They were gambling, they were 633 00:42:49,500 --> 00:42:52,906 betting against time that they would have a fix to MCAS before 634 00:42:52,930 --> 00:42:57,206 the next crash happened. And, unfortunately, they lost 635 00:42:57,230 --> 00:43:02,476 that bet. NARRATOR: Not everyone within 636 00:43:02,500 --> 00:43:04,900 the F.A.A. agreed with the agency's gamble. 637 00:43:05,530 --> 00:43:09,446 People too quickly jumped to that conclusion, that the pilot 638 00:43:09,470 --> 00:43:12,206 should have been able to figure out what's going wrong and be 639 00:43:12,230 --> 00:43:16,776 able to intervene properly. NARRATOR: F.A.A. engineer 640 00:43:16,800 --> 00:43:20,146 Joe Jacobsen examined the data from the Lion Air crash, and 641 00:43:20,170 --> 00:43:23,906 quickly raised concerns about the safety of the MAX. 642 00:43:23,930 --> 00:43:27,106 This is his first on-camera interview. 643 00:43:27,130 --> 00:43:29,076 I was pointing out a design flaw. 644 00:43:29,100 --> 00:43:33,346 It was purposely designed and certified to use only one A.O.A. 645 00:43:33,370 --> 00:43:36,776 input to drive MCAS to move the horizontal stabilizer at a high 646 00:43:36,800 --> 00:43:39,406 rate. I talked to three managers, 647 00:43:39,430 --> 00:43:42,806 said, "This a design flaw." They were skeptical, not really 648 00:43:42,830 --> 00:43:46,306 buying in, saying, you know, "The pilot should have been 649 00:43:46,330 --> 00:43:48,370 able to intervene." It's a failure. 650 00:43:50,170 --> 00:43:54,406 Our job is aviation safety, and when airplanes go down, we feel 651 00:43:54,430 --> 00:44:01,676 a real personal sense of loss and remorse and failure, and it 652 00:44:01,700 --> 00:44:07,906 affects a lot of people. ♪ ♪ 653 00:44:07,930 --> 00:44:10,976 NARRATOR: In the fall of 2019, with the MAX having been 654 00:44:11,000 --> 00:44:14,206 grounded for seven months, congressional investigators 655 00:44:14,230 --> 00:44:17,206 released internal communications they found during their 656 00:44:17,230 --> 00:44:19,246 investigation. Test pilots working for 657 00:44:19,270 --> 00:44:23,146 Boeing wrtie about problems with the MCAS system two years 658 00:44:23,170 --> 00:44:26,176 before the first fatal crash in Indonesia. 659 00:44:26,200 --> 00:44:27,806 NARRATOR: They offered further evidence of the 660 00:44:27,830 --> 00:44:30,200 company's attempt to avoid pilot training for the MAX. 661 00:44:30,870 --> 00:44:34,376 When we got the messages, and I remember where I was in my 662 00:44:34,400 --> 00:44:36,600 kitchen, because it was Mark Forkner. 663 00:44:38,600 --> 00:44:40,946 NARRATOR: In one document, the former Boeing pilot who had 664 00:44:40,970 --> 00:44:44,106 written notes assuring MCAS would not be put in training 665 00:44:44,130 --> 00:44:47,806 manuals, joked about swaying regulators with "Jedi 666 00:44:47,830 --> 00:44:52,376 mind tricking." Other documents released later 667 00:44:52,400 --> 00:44:55,476 even showed Forkner dismissing the idea of pilot training for 668 00:44:55,500 --> 00:44:59,746 Lion Air. When Lion Air, the airline 669 00:44:59,770 --> 00:45:03,276 that ultimately flew the first plane that crashed, was asking 670 00:45:03,300 --> 00:45:06,976 for simulator training, he was disparaging them to his 671 00:45:07,000 --> 00:45:12,106 colleagues. Calling them stupid. 672 00:45:12,130 --> 00:45:16,646 I mean, seriously? Did that ever cross their minds 673 00:45:16,670 --> 00:45:20,376 that they were going to let something go into the air that 674 00:45:20,400 --> 00:45:27,276 could potentially kill people? ♪ ♪ 675 00:45:27,300 --> 00:45:29,306 NARRATOR: Boeing C.E.O. Dennis Muilenburg appeared 676 00:45:29,330 --> 00:45:32,176 before Congress. Boeing C.E.O. is expected to 677 00:45:32,200 --> 00:45:34,806 acknowledge that his company made mistakes. 678 00:45:34,830 --> 00:45:38,576 And here's the first time this guy's in the hot seat. 679 00:45:38,600 --> 00:45:43,846 NARRATOR: By then he'd become the face of the 737 MAX crisis. 680 00:45:43,870 --> 00:45:46,246 I have been on this a committee a long time. 681 00:45:46,270 --> 00:45:48,876 We have never undertaken an investigation of this magnitude. 682 00:45:48,900 --> 00:45:53,206 We intentionally put the families close to the witness. 683 00:45:53,230 --> 00:45:56,746 They're the victims here. And it should be like a, you 684 00:45:56,770 --> 00:46:01,106 know, a trial in court, where you get to face the person who, 685 00:46:01,130 --> 00:46:04,506 you know, who committed a violent act against you. 686 00:46:04,530 --> 00:46:08,206 ♪ ♪ NARRATOR: The Committee 687 00:46:08,230 --> 00:46:10,546 confronted Muilenburg with an array of internal Boeing 688 00:46:10,570 --> 00:46:13,246 documents. The next slide. 689 00:46:13,270 --> 00:46:16,376 This shows that Boeing became aware that the disagree alert 690 00:46:16,400 --> 00:46:18,476 wasn't working. It does appear from this that 691 00:46:18,500 --> 00:46:20,806 Boeing understood how important the crew training... 692 00:46:20,830 --> 00:46:23,306 That pilots didn't know about this is unacceptable. 693 00:46:23,330 --> 00:46:25,076 Boeing's marketing representatives emphasized to 694 00:46:25,100 --> 00:46:27,706 potential customers that F.A.A. had reduced the length of pilot 695 00:46:27,730 --> 00:46:30,676 training that... Slow reaction time scenario, 696 00:46:30,700 --> 00:46:33,630 ten seconds, found the failure to be catastrophic. 697 00:46:34,800 --> 00:46:39,176 For those families, the pain of this was accentuated because 698 00:46:39,200 --> 00:46:44,476 this evidence that was going up on the screen was information 699 00:46:44,500 --> 00:46:46,906 that they felt that Mr. Muilenburg could have used to 700 00:46:46,930 --> 00:46:50,746 inform his decision about keeping the plane in the air... 701 00:46:50,770 --> 00:46:53,976 Or not. We do know that Boeing 702 00:46:54,000 --> 00:46:59,046 engineers actually proposed placing a MCAS annunciator in 703 00:46:59,070 --> 00:47:01,276 the cockpit. Are we vulnerable to a single 704 00:47:01,300 --> 00:47:03,606 A.O.A. sensor failure with the MCAS? 705 00:47:03,630 --> 00:47:06,676 Now, as you emphasized, flight control will now compare inputs 706 00:47:06,700 --> 00:47:11,246 from both A.O.A. sensors. And I guess the question is why 707 00:47:11,270 --> 00:47:16,246 wasn't it that way from day one? Mr. Chairman, we've asked 708 00:47:16,270 --> 00:47:19,506 ourselves that same question over and over. 709 00:47:19,530 --> 00:47:22,306 And if back then we knew everything that we know now, we 710 00:47:22,330 --> 00:47:24,346 would have made a different decision. 711 00:47:24,370 --> 00:47:30,670 Nadia Milleron, she was radiating with anger over this. 712 00:47:31,870 --> 00:47:34,846 It's come to the point where you're not the person anymore 713 00:47:34,870 --> 00:47:38,046 to solve the situation. I want to say it to you 714 00:47:38,070 --> 00:47:40,706 directly, because I don't think you understand what we're 715 00:47:40,730 --> 00:47:42,906 saying. She was right in front of 716 00:47:42,930 --> 00:47:45,006 him. And here you have the C.E.O. of 717 00:47:45,030 --> 00:47:47,506 what is one of the most important American companies, 718 00:47:47,530 --> 00:47:49,876 one of the most important companies in the world... 719 00:47:49,900 --> 00:47:51,646 In the end, it's about safety. 720 00:47:51,670 --> 00:47:54,006 Even if you're not capable of doing that? 721 00:47:54,030 --> 00:47:58,946 Looking in the eyes of the mother of a young woman who died 722 00:47:58,970 --> 00:48:04,846 on his airplane. I know that she wasn't afraid 723 00:48:04,870 --> 00:48:09,230 of flying at all, until the last six minutes of her life. 724 00:48:10,530 --> 00:48:17,406 That's just a horrible betrayal that Boeing and the F.A.A. 725 00:48:17,430 --> 00:48:21,346 caused for this person, the last moments of their life, and it 726 00:48:21,370 --> 00:48:26,846 kills me that that trust was betrayed. 727 00:48:26,870 --> 00:48:29,446 Boeing is really kind of stuck in a hard spot here. 728 00:48:29,470 --> 00:48:32,276 Dennis Muilenburg was blasted on Capitol Hill. 729 00:48:32,300 --> 00:48:34,576 NARRATOR: Two months later, with the company's stock 730 00:48:34,600 --> 00:48:36,776 plummeting... Boeing stock has been 731 00:48:36,800 --> 00:48:39,346 dropping all day. It's down 22% since the 737 732 00:48:39,370 --> 00:48:42,076 MAX jet was first grounded back in... 733 00:48:42,100 --> 00:48:44,146 NARRATOR: and the MAX still grounded, Dennis 734 00:48:44,170 --> 00:48:52,106 Muilenburg was out. Near the one-year anniversary of 735 00:48:52,130 --> 00:48:54,946 the second 737 MAX crash, New York Times reporters 736 00:48:54,970 --> 00:48:58,806 Natalie Kitroeff and David Gelles flew to St. Louis. 737 00:48:58,830 --> 00:49:04,146 ♪ ♪ By then, Boeing was recommending 738 00:49:04,170 --> 00:49:08,206 pilot training and retooling the MCAS software with a second 739 00:49:08,230 --> 00:49:13,046 A.O.A. input as a failsafe. They'd been invited to Boeing's 740 00:49:13,070 --> 00:49:16,876 offices there by the new C.E.O. Welcome. 741 00:49:16,900 --> 00:49:19,376 Thank you for having us. NARRATOR: The interview was 742 00:49:19,400 --> 00:49:21,306 recorded. Glad you're here. 743 00:49:21,330 --> 00:49:24,876 We got a lot of questions. NARRATOR: He had been on the 744 00:49:24,900 --> 00:49:28,646 company board of directors throughout the 737 MAX program 745 00:49:28,670 --> 00:49:32,176 and described himself as the company's "backup plan" to 746 00:49:32,200 --> 00:49:35,846 Dennis Muilenburg's handling of the crisis. 747 00:49:35,870 --> 00:49:40,276 Boards are invested in their C.E.O.s until they're not. 748 00:49:40,300 --> 00:49:43,006 We had a backup plan. I think this board was 749 00:49:43,030 --> 00:49:47,276 incredibly well prepared. I am the backup plan. 750 00:49:47,300 --> 00:49:50,246 David Calhoun had been on the board of Boeing for several 751 00:49:50,270 --> 00:49:54,146 years. He laid the blame squarely at 752 00:49:54,170 --> 00:49:57,646 the feet of Dennis Muilenburg. NARRATOR: He was in the midst 753 00:49:57,670 --> 00:50:01,646 of damage control. It's more than I imagined it 754 00:50:01,670 --> 00:50:06,346 would be, honestly. And it speaks to the weaknesses 755 00:50:06,370 --> 00:50:09,846 of our leadership. He was shooting straight from 756 00:50:09,870 --> 00:50:13,706 the hip. It was kind of disarming to hear 757 00:50:13,730 --> 00:50:17,506 from the C.E.O. of Boeing. NARRATOR: He told the 758 00:50:17,530 --> 00:50:21,406 reporters the company had indeed made a "fatal mistake," which 759 00:50:21,430 --> 00:50:26,906 was assuming all pilots could counteract a misfire of MCAS. 760 00:50:26,930 --> 00:50:30,176 We made a decision in December to recommend simulator 761 00:50:30,200 --> 00:50:35,906 training everywhere in the world because of the regulators and 762 00:50:35,930 --> 00:50:38,176 the pilots in the developing world. 763 00:50:38,200 --> 00:50:41,006 Not because the U.S. airlines needed it. 764 00:50:41,030 --> 00:50:45,206 They probably don't. There is this narrative that 765 00:50:45,230 --> 00:50:49,106 some foreign pilots are not as good as American pilots. 766 00:50:49,130 --> 00:50:51,676 And Boeing seemed to be suggesting as much. 767 00:50:51,700 --> 00:50:54,276 We pressed Calhoun on this issue. 768 00:50:54,300 --> 00:50:58,146 Do you believe that if U.S. pilots had encountered the MCAS 769 00:50:58,170 --> 00:51:02,406 malfunction, that Lion Air and Ethiopian 302 experienced, would 770 00:51:02,430 --> 00:51:05,446 they have been able to deal with it in your estimation? 771 00:51:05,470 --> 00:51:08,946 And, um... I'm not gonna let you write this down. 772 00:51:08,970 --> 00:51:11,246 You agree you're not going to write it down? 773 00:51:11,270 --> 00:51:14,376 No. All right, forget it. 774 00:51:14,400 --> 00:51:18,576 You can guess the answer. That interview was 775 00:51:18,600 --> 00:51:22,976 essentially the last Boeing story that we did. 776 00:51:23,000 --> 00:51:25,576 To this day, I think, Boeing doesn't accept full 777 00:51:25,600 --> 00:51:28,006 responsibility for these crashes. 778 00:51:28,030 --> 00:51:31,376 There's always the implication that if the pilots had acted 779 00:51:31,400 --> 00:51:36,606 appropriately, those 346 people would still be alive today. 780 00:51:36,630 --> 00:51:41,876 ♪ ♪ NARRATOR: In March of 2021, 781 00:51:41,900 --> 00:51:45,106 families gathered in Washington, D.C., for the second anniversary 782 00:51:45,130 --> 00:51:49,576 of the crash of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302. 783 00:51:49,600 --> 00:51:53,106 Boeing had recently settled a criminal charge of conspiracy to 784 00:51:53,130 --> 00:51:55,746 defraud the United States brought by the Department of 785 00:51:55,770 --> 00:51:58,276 Justice. We have some breaking news on 786 00:51:58,300 --> 00:52:00,606 Boeing. NARRATOR: In the settlement, 787 00:52:00,630 --> 00:52:03,946 Boeing admitted to "misleading statements, half-truths and 788 00:52:03,970 --> 00:52:09,976 omissions" about MCAS. It agreed to pay $2.5 billion... 789 00:52:10,000 --> 00:52:13,676 $500 million to the families of the victims, and most of the 790 00:52:13,700 --> 00:52:20,146 rest to compensate the airlines. The F.A.A. has retested 791 00:52:20,170 --> 00:52:24,946 and approved the 737 MAX. It is once again flying 792 00:52:24,970 --> 00:52:32,970 passengers around the world. 793 00:52:34,930 --> 00:52:38,976 Go to pbs.org/frontline for more on what’s happened since 794 00:52:39,000 --> 00:52:42,776 the crashes of the 737 Max. We had a backup plan. 795 00:52:42,800 --> 00:52:44,546 I think this board was incredibly well prepared. 796 00:52:44,570 --> 00:52:47,076 I am the backup plan. And more reporting from 797 00:52:47,100 --> 00:52:50,576 our partners at The New York Times. 798 00:52:50,600 --> 00:52:54,376 Then visit the FRONTLINE archive to stream our films about 9/11 799 00:52:54,400 --> 00:52:57,046 and hundreds more. Connect with FRONTLINE on 800 00:52:57,070 --> 00:52:58,946 Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter. 801 00:52:58,970 --> 00:53:02,700 And stream anytime on the PBS Video App or pbs.org/frontline. 802 00:53:23,100 --> 00:53:30,406 Captioned by Media Access Group at WGBH 803 00:53:30,430 --> 00:53:32,646 access.wgbh.org For more on this and other 804 00:53:32,670 --> 00:53:36,246 "Frontline" programs, visit our website at pbs.org/frontline. 805 00:53:36,270 --> 00:53:44,270 ♪ ♪ Frontline's "Boeing's Fatal 806 00:53:48,770 --> 00:53:50,846 Flaw" is avaliable on 807 00:53:50,870 --> 00:53:51,870 Amazon Prime Video.